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Strategy Complexity of Concurrent Stochastic Games
with Safety and Reachability Objectives
Krishnendu Chatterjee∗ Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen† Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen‡
Abstract
We consider finite-state concurrent stochastic games, played by k ≥ 2 players for an infinite number of rounds,
where in every round, each player simultaneously and independently of the other players chooses an action, whereafter
the successor state is determined by a probability distribution given by the current state and the chosen actions. We
consider reachability objectives that given a target set of states require that some state in the target set is visited, and
the dual safety objectives that given a target set require that only states in the target set are visited. We are interested
in the complexity of stationary strategies measured by their patience, which is defined as the inverse of the smallest
non-zero probability employed.
Our main results are as follows: We show that in two-player zero-sum concurrent stochastic games (with reach-
ability objective for one player and the complementary safety objective for the other player): (i) the optimal bound
on the patience of optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies, for both players is doubly exponential; and (ii) even in games
with a single non-absorbing state exponential (in the number of actions) patience is necessary. In general we study
the class of non-zero-sum games admitting ε-Nash equilibria. We show that if there is at least one player with reach-
ability objective, then doubly-exponential patience is needed in general for ε-Nash equilibrium strategies, whereas in
contrast if all players have safety objectives, then the optimal bound on patience for ε-Nash equilibrium strategies is
only exponential.
1 Introduction
Concurrent stochastic games. Concurrent stochastic games are played on finite-state graphs by k players for an
infinite number of rounds. In every round, each player simultaneously and independently of the other players chooses
moves (or actions). The current state and the chosen moves of the players determine a probability distribution over the
successor state. The result of playing the game (or a play) is an infinite sequence of states and action vectors. These
games with two players were introduced in a seminal work by Shapley [34], and have been one of the most funda-
mental and well-studied game models in stochastic graph games. Matrix games (or normal form games) can model
a wide range problems with diverse applications, when there is a finite number of interactions [29, 37]. Concurrent
stochastic games can be viewed as a finite set of matrix games, such that the choices made in the current game deter-
mine which game is played next, and is the appropriate model for many applications [17]. Moreover, in analysis of
reactive systems, concurrent games provide the appropriate model for reactive systems with components that interact
synchronously [12, 13, 2].
Objectives. An objective for a player defines the set of desired plays for the player, i.e., if a play belongs to the
objective of the player, then the player wins and gets payoff 1, otherwise the player looses and gets payoff 0. The
most basic objectives for concurrent games are the reachability and the safety objectives. Given a set F of states, a
reachability objective with target set F requires that some state in F is visited at least once, whereas the dual safety
objective with target set F requires that only states in F are visited. In this paper, we will only consider reachability and
safety objectives. A zero-sum game consists of two players (player 1 and player 2), and the objectives of the players
are complementary, i.e., a reachability objective with target set F for one player and a safety objective with target set
complement of F for the other player. In this work, when we refer to zero-sum games we will imply that one player
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has reachability objective, and the other player has the complementary safety objective. Concurrent zero-sum games
are relevant in many applications. For example, the synthesis problem in control theory (e.g., discrete-event systems as
considered in [32]) corresponds to reactive synthesis of [31]. The synthesis problem for synchronous reactive systems
is appropriately modeled as concurrent games [12, 13, 14]. Other than control theory, concurrent zero-sum games also
provide the appropriate model to study several other interesting problems, such as two-player poker games [28].
Properties of strategies in zero-sum games. Given a zero-sum concurrent stochastic game, the player-1 value v1(s)
of the game at a state s is the limit probability with which he can guarantee his objective against all strategies of
player 2. The player-2 value v2(s) is analogously the limit probability with which player 2 can ensure his own
objective against all strategies of player 1. Concurrent zero-sum games are determined [16], i.e., for each state s we
have v1(s) + v2(s) = 1. A strategy for a player, given a history (i.e., finite prefix of a play) specifies a probability
distribution over the actions. A stationary strategy does not depend on the history, but only on the current state. For
ǫ ≥ 0, a strategy is ǫ-optimal for a state s for player i if it ensures his own objective with probability at least vi(s)− ǫ
against all strategies of the opponent. A 0-optimal strategy is an optimal strategy. In zero-sum concurrent stochastic
games, there exist stationary optimal strategies for the player with safety objectives [30, 23]; whereas in contrast, for
the player with reachability objectives optimal strategies do not exist in general, however, for every ǫ > 0 there exists
stationary ǫ-optimal strategies [16].
The significance of patience and roundedness of strategies. The basic decision problem is as follows: given a
zero-sum concurrent stochastic game and a rational threshold λ, decide whether v1(s) ≥ λ. The basic decision
problem is in PSPACEand is square-root sum hard [15]1. Given the hardness of the basic decision problem, the next
most relevant computational problem is to compute an approximation of the value. The computational complexity of
the approximation problem is closely related to the size of the description of ǫ-optimal strategies. Even for special
cases of zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, namely turn-based stochastic games, where in each state at most one
player can choose between multiple moves, the best known complexity results are obtained by guessing an optimal
strategy and computing the value in the game obtained after fixing the guessed strategy. A strategy has patience p if
p is the inverse of the smallest non-zero probability used by a distribution describing the strategy. A rational valued
strategy has roundedness q if q is the greatest denominator of the probabilities used by the distributions describing the
strategy. Note that if a strategy has roundedness q, then it also has patience at most q. The description complexity
of a stationary strategy can be bounded by the roundedness. A stationary strategy with exponential roundedness,
can be described using polynomially many bits, whereas the explicit description of stationary strategies with doubly-
exponential patience is not polynomial. Thus obtaining upper bounds on the roundedness and lower bounds on the
patience is at the heart of the computational complexity analysis of concurrent stochastic games.
Strategies in non-zero-sum games and roundedness. In non-zero-sum games, the most well-studied notion of
equilibrium is Nash equilibrium [26], which is a strategy vector (one for each player), such that no player has an
incentive of unilateral deviation (i.e., if the strategies of all other players are fixed, then a player cannot switch strategy
and improve his own payoff). The existence of Nash equilibrium in non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games where
all players have safety objectives has been established in [33]. It follows from the strategy characterization of the
result of [33] and our Lemma 41 that if such strategies have exponential roundness and forms an ǫ-Nash equilibrium,
for a constant or even logarithmic number of players, for ǫ > 0, then there will be polynomial-size witness for those
strategies (and the approximation of a Nash equilibrium can be achieved in TFNP, see Remark 44). Thus again the
notion of roundedness is at the core of the computational complexity of non-zero-sum games.
Previous results and our contributions. In this work we consider concurrent stochastic games (both zero-sum and
non-zero-sum) where the objectives of the players are either reachability or safety. We first describe the relevant
previous results and then our contributions.
Previous results. For zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, the optimal bound on patience and roundedness for
ǫ-optimal strategies for reachability objectives, for ǫ > 0, is doubly exponential [22, 20]. The doubly-exponential
lower bound is obtained by presenting a family of games (namely, Purgatory) where the reachability player requires
doubly-exponential patience (however, in this game the patience of the safety player is 1) [22, 20]; whereas the doubly-
exponential upper bound is obtained by expressing the values in the existential theory of reals [22, 20]. In contrast to
reachability objectives that in general do not admit optimal strategies, similar to safety objectives there are two related
1The square-root sum problem is an important problem from computational geometry, where given a set of natural numbers n1, n2, . . . , nk ,
the question is whether the sum of the square roots exceed an integer b. The problem is not known to be in NP.
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classes of concurrent stochastic games that admit optimal stationary strategies, namely, discounted-sum objectives,
and ergodic concurrent games. For both these classes the optimal bound on patience and roundedness for ǫ-optimal
strategies, for ǫ > 0, is exponential [11, 24]. The optimal bound on patience and roundedness for optimal and ǫ-optimal
strategies, for ǫ > 0, for safety objectives has been an open problem.
Our contributions. Our main results are as follows:
1. Lower bound: general. We show that in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, a lower bound on patience
of optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, for safety objectives is doubly exponential (in contrast to the
above mentioned related classes of games that admit stationary optimal strategies and require only exponential
patience). We present a family of games (namely, Purgatory Duel) where the optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies,
for ǫ > 0, for both players require doubly-exponential patience.
2. Lower bound: three states. We show that even in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with three states of
which two are absorbing (sink states with only self-loop transitions) the patience required for optimal and ǫ-
optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, is exponential (in the number of actions). An optimal (resp., ǫ-optimal, for ǫ > 0)
strategy in a game with three states (with two absorbing states) is basically an optimal (resp., ǫ-optimal) strategy
of a matrix game, where some entries of the matrix game depends on the value of the non-absorbing state (as
some transitions of the non-absorbing state can lead to itself). In standard matrix games, the patience for ǫ-
optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, is only logarithmic [27]; and perhaps surprisingly in contrast we show that the
patience for ǫ-optimal strategies in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with three states is exponential (i.e.,
there is a doubly-exponential increase from logarithmic to exponential).
3. Upper bound. We show that in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, an upper bound on the patience of optimal
strategies and an upper bound on the patience and roundedness of ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, is as follows:
(a) doubly exponential in general; and (b) exponential for the safety player if the number of value classes (i.e.,
the number of different values in the game) is constant. Hence our upper bounds on roundedness match our
lower bound results for patience. Our results also imply that if the number of value classes is constant, then the
basic decision problem is in coNP(resp., NP) if player 1 has reachability (resp., safety) objective.
4. Non-zero-sum games. We consider non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with reachability and safety
objectives. First, we show that it easily follows from our example family of Purgatory Duel that if there are at
least two players and there is at least one player with reachability objective, then a lower bound on patience for
ǫ-Nash equilibrium is doubly exponential, for ǫ > 0, for all players. In contrast, we show that if all players
have safety objectives, then the optimal bound on patience of strategies for ǫ-Nash equilibrium is exponential,
for ǫ > 0 (i.e., for upper bound we show that there always exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium where the strategy of
each player requires at most exponential roundedness; and there exists a family of games, where for any ǫ-Nash
equilibrium the strategies of all players require at least exponential patience).
In summary, we present a complete picture of the patience and roundedness required in zero-sum concurrent stochastic
games, and non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with safety objectives for all players. Also see Section 7.2 for
a discussion on important technical aspects of our results.
Distinguishing aspects of safety and reachability. While the optimal bound on patience and roundedness we estab-
lish in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games for the safety player matches that for the reachability player, there are
many distinguishing aspects for safety as compared to reachability in terms of the number of value classes (as shown
in Table 1). For the reachability player, if there is one value class, then the patience and roundedness required is linear:
it follows from the results of [7] that if there is one value class then all the values must be either 1 or 0; and if all states
have value 0, then any strategy is optimal, and if all states have value 1, then it follows from [14, 8] that there is an
almost-sure winning strategy (that ensures the objective with probability 1) from all states and the optimal bound on
patience and roundedness is linear. The family of game graphs defined by Purgatory has two value classes, and the
reachability player requires doubly exponential patience and roundedness, even for two value classes. In contrast, if
there are (at most) two value classes, then again the values are 1 and 0; and in value class 1, the safety player has an op-
timal strategy that is stationary and deterministic (i.e., a positional strategy) and has patience and roundedness 1 [14],
and in value class 0 any strategy is optimal. While for two value classes, the patience and roundedness is 1 for the
safety player, we show that for three value classes (even for three states) the patience and roundedness is exponential,
and in general the patience and roundedness is doubly exponential (and such a finer characterization does not exist for
reachability objectives). Finally, for non-zero-sum games (as we establish), if there are at least two players, then even
in the presence of one reachability player, the patience required is at least doubly exponential, whereas if all players
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have safety objectives, the patience required is only exponential.
# Value classes Reachability Safety
1 Linear One
2 Double-exponential One
3 Double-exponential Exponential
LB, Theorem 29
Constant Double-exponential Exponential
UB, Corollary 34
General Double-exponential Double-exponential
LB, Theorem 20
UB, Corollary 34
Table 1: Strategy complexity (i.e., patience and roundedness of ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0) of reachability vs
safety objectives depending on the number of value classes. Our results are bold faced, and LB (resp., UB) denotes
lower (resp., upper) bound on patience (resp., roundedness).
Our main ideas. Our most interesting results are the doubly-exponential and exponential lower bound on the patience
and roundedness in zero-sum games. We now present a brief overview about the lower bound example.
The game of Purgatory [22, 20] is a concurrent reachability game [14] that was defined as an example showing
that the reachability player must, in order to play near optimally, use a strategy with non-zero probabilities that are
doubly exponentially small in the number of states of the game (i.e., the patience is doubly exponential).
In this paper we present another example of a reachability game where this is the case for the safety player as well.
The game Purgatory consists of a (potentially infinite) sequence of escape attempts. In an escape attempt one player is
given the role of the escapee and the other player is given the role as the guard. An escape attempt consists of at most
N rounds. In each round, the guard selects and hides a number between 1 and m, and the escapee must try to guess
the number. If the escapee successfully guesses the number N times, the game ends with the escapee as the winner.
If the escapee incorrectly guesses a number which is strictly larger than the hidden number, the game ends with the
guard as the winner. Otherwise, if the escapee incorrectly guesses a number which is strictly smaller than the hidden
number, the escape attempt is over and the game continues.
The game of Purgatory is such that the reachability player is always given the role of the escapee, and the safety
player is always given the role of the guard. If neither player wins during an escape attempt (meaning there is an
infinite number of escape attempts) the safety player wins. Purgatory may be modelled as a concurrent reachability
game consisting of N non-absorbing positions in which each player has m actions. The value of each non-absorbing
position is 1. This means that the reachability player has, for any ε > 0, a stationary strategy that wins from each
non-absorbing position with probability at least 1− ε [16], but such strategies must have doubly-exponential patience.
In fact for N sufficiently large and m ≥ 2, such strategies must have patience at least 2mN/3 for ε = 1 − 4m−N/2
[20]. For the safety player however, the situation is simple: any strategy is optimal.
We introduce a game we call the Purgatory Duel in which the safety player must also use strategies of doubly-
exponential patience to play near optimally. The main idea of the game is that it forces the safety player to behave as
a reachability player. We can describe the new game as a variation on the above description of the Purgatory game.
The Purgatory Duel consists also of a (potentially infinite) sequence of escape attempts. But now, before each escape
attempt the role of the escapee is given to each player with probability 12 , and in each escape attempt the rules are as
described above. The game remains asymmetric in the sense that if neither player wins during an escape attempt, the
safety player wins.
The Purgatory Duel may be modelled as a concurrent reachability game consisting of 2N + 1 non-absorbing
positions, in which each player has m actions, except for a single position where the players each have just a single
action.
Technical contribution. The key non-trivial aspects of our proof are as follows: first, is to come up with the family of
games, namely, Purgatory Duel, where the ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ ≥ 0, for the players are symmetric, even though
the objectives are complementary; and then the precise analysis of the game needs to combine and extend several
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ideas, such as refined analysis of matrix games, and analysis of perturbed Markov decision processes (MDPs) which
are one-player stochastic games.
Highlights. We highlight two features of our results, namely, the surprising aspects and the significance (see Sec-
tion 7.1 for further details).
1. Surprising aspects. The first surprising aspect of our result is the doubly-exponential lower bound for concurrent
safety games. The properties of strategies in concurrent safety games resemble concurrent disocunted games,
as in both cases optimal stationary strategies exist, and locally optimal strategies are optimal. We show that
in contrast to concurrent discounted games where exponential patience suffices for concurrent safety games
doubly-exponential patience is necessary. The second surprising aspect is the lower bound example itself. The
lower bound example is obtained as follows: (i) given Purgatory we first obtain simplified Purgatory by changing
the start state such that it deterministically goes to the next state; (ii) we then consider its dual where the roles of
the players are exchanged; and (iii) Purgatory duel is obtained by merging the start states of simplified Purgatory
and its dual. Both in simplified Purgatory and its dual, there are only two value classes, and positional optimal
strategies exist for the safety player. Surprisingly we show that a simple merge operation gives a game with
linear number of value classes and the patience increases from 1 to doubly-exponential. Finally, the properties
of strategies in concurrent reachability and safety games differ substantially. An important aspect of our lower
bound example is that we show how to modify an example for reachability game to obtain the result for safety
games.
2. Significance. Our most important results are the lower bounds, and the main significance is threefold. First,
the most well-studied way to obtain computational complexity result in games is to explicitly guess strategies,
and then verify the game obtained fixing the strategy. The lower bound for concurrent reachability games by
itself did not rule out that better complexity results can be obtained through better strategy complexity for safety
games (indeed, for constant number of value classes, we obtain a better complexity result than known before
due to the exponential bound on roundedness). Our doubly-exponential lower bound shows that in general the
method of explicitly guessing strategies would require exponential space, and would not yield NP or coNP
upper bounds. Second, one of the most well-studied algorithm for games is the strategy-iteration algorithm.
Our result implies that any natural variant of the strategy-iteration algorithm for the safety player that explicitly
compute strategies require exponential space in the worst-case. Finally, in games, strategies that are witness to
the values and specify how to play the game, are as important as values, and our results establish the precise
strategy complexity (matching upper bound of roundedness with lower bounds of patience).
Related work. We have already discussed the relevant related works such as [30, 23, 16, 15, 22, 20, 14] on zero-sum
games. We discuss relevant related works for non-zero-sum games. The computational complexity of constrained
Nash equilibrium, which asks the existence of Nash (or ǫ-Nash, for ǫ > 0) equilibrium that guarantees at least a payoff
vector has been studied. The constrained Nash equilibrium problem is undecidable even for turn-based stochastic
games, or concurrent deterministic games with randomized strategies [35, 6]. The complexity of constrained Nash
equilibrium in concurrent deterministic games with pure strategies has been studied in [4, 5]. In contrast, we study
the complexity of computing some Nash equilibrium in randomized strategies in concurrent stochastic games, and our
result on roundedness implies that with safety objectives for all players the approximation of some Nash equilibrium
can be achieved in TFNP.
2 Definitions
Other number. Given a number i ∈ {1, 2} let î be the other number, i.e., if i = 1, then î = 2 and if i = 2, then î = 1.
Probability distributions. A probability distribution d over a finite set Z , is a map d : Z → [0, 1], such that∑
z∈Z d(z) = 1. Fix a probability distribution d over a set Z . The distribution d is pure (Dirac) if d(z) = 1 for
some z ∈ Z and for convenience we overload the notation and let d = z. The support Supp(d) is the subset Z ′ of Z ,
such that z ∈ Z ′ if and only if d(z) > 0. The distribution d is totally mixed if Supp(d) = Z . The patience of d is
maxz∈Supp(d)
1
d(z) , i.e., the inverse of the minimum non-zero probability. The roundedness of d, if d(z) is a rational
number for all z ∈ Z , is the greatest denominator of d(z). Note that roundness of d is always at least the patience of
d. Given two elements z, z′ ∈ Z , the probability distribution d = U(z, z′) over Z is such that d(z) = d(z′) = 12 . Let
∆(Z) be the set of all probability distributions over Z .
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Concurrent game structure. A concurrent game structure for k players, consists of (1) a finite set of states S,
of size N ; and (2) for each state s ∈ S and each player i a set Ais of actions (and Ai =
⋃
sA
i
s is the set of all
actions for player i, for each i; and A =
⋃
iA
i is the set of all actions) such that Ais consists of at most m actions;
and (3) a stochastic transition function δ : S × A1 × A2 × · · · × Ak → ∆(S). Also, a state s is deterministic if
δ(s, a1, a2, . . . , ak) is pure (deterministic), for all ai ∈ Ais and for all i. A state s is called absorbing if Ais = {a} for
all i and δ(s, a, a, . . . , a) = s. The number δmin is
min
s,a1,...,ak,s′∈Supp(δ(s,a1,a2,...,ak))
(δ(s, a1, a2, . . . , ak)(s
′)) ,
i.e., the smallest non-zero transition probability.
Safety and reachability objectives. Each player i, who has a safety or reachability objective, is identified by a pair
(ti, S
i), where ti ∈ {Reach, Safety} and Si ⊆ S.
Concurrent games and how to play them. Fix a number k of players. A concurrent game consists of a concurrent
game structure for k players and for each player i a pair (ti, Si), identifying the type of that player. The game G,
starting in state s, is played as follows: initially a pebble is placed on v0 := s. In each time step T ≥ 0, the pebble
is on some state vT and each player selects (simultaneously and independently of the other players, like in the game
rock-paper-scissors) an action aiT+1 ∈ AivT . Then, the game selects vT+1 according to the probability distribution
δ(vT , a
1
T+1, a
2
T+1, . . . , a
k
T+1) and moves the pebble onto vT+1. The game then continues with time step T + 1 (i.e.,
the game consists of infinitely many time steps). For a round T , let aT+1 be the vector of choices of the actions for
the players, i.e., (aT+1)i is the choice of player i, for each i. Round 0 is identified by v0 and round T > 0 is then
identified by the pair (aT , vT ). A play Ps, starting in state v0 = s, is then a sequence of rounds
(v0, (a1, v1), (a2, v2), . . . , (aT , vT ), . . . ) ,
and for each ℓ a prefix of P ℓs of length ℓ is then
(v0, (a1, v1), (a2, v2), . . . , (aT , vT ), . . . , (aℓ, vℓ)) ,
and we say that P ℓs ends in vℓ. For each i, player i wins in the play Ps, if ti = Safety and vT ∈ Si for all T ≥ 0;
or if ti = Reach and vT ∈ Si, for some T ≥ 0. Otherwise, player i loses. For each i, player i tries to maximize the
probability that he wins.
Strategies. Fix a player i. A strategy is a recipe to choose a probability distribution over actions given a finite prefix of
a play. Formally, a strategy σi for player i is a map from P ℓs , for a play Ps of length ℓ starting at state s, to a distribution
overAivℓ . Player i follows a strategy σi, if given the current prefix of a play is P ℓs , he selects aℓ+1 according to σi(P ℓs ),
for all plays Ps starting at s and all lengths ℓ. A strategy σi for player i, is stationary, if for all ℓ and ℓ′, and all pair of
plays Ps and P ′s′ , starting at states s and s′ respectively, such that P ℓs and (P ′)ℓ
′
s′ ends in the same state t, we have that
σi(P
ℓ
s ) = σi((P
′)ℓ
′
s′); and we write σi(t) for the unique distribution used for prefix of plays ending in t. The patience
(resp., roundedness) of a strategy σi is the supremum of the patience (resp., roundedness) of the distribution σi(P ℓs ),
over all plays Ps starting at state s, and all lengths ℓ. Also, a strategy σi is pure (resp., totally mixed) if σi(P ℓs ) is pure
(resp., totally mixed), for all plays Ps starting at s and all lengths ℓ. A strategy is positional if it is pure and stationary.
For each player i, let Σi be the set of all strategies for the respective player.
Strategy profiles and Nash equilibria. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i is a vector of strategies, one for each player. A
strategy profile σ defines a unique probability measure on plays, denoted Prσ , when the players follow their respective
strategies [36]. Let u(G, s, σ, i) be the probability that player i wins the game G when the players follow σ and the
play starts in s (i.e., the utility or payoff for player i). Given a strategy profile σ = (σi)i and a strategy σ′i for player i,
the strategy profile σ[σ′i] is the strategy profile where the strategy for player i is σ′i and the strategy for player j is σj
for j 6= i. Fix a state s and ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ forms an ε-Nash equilibrium from state s if for all i and
all strategies σ′i for player i, we have that u(G, s, σ, i) ≥ u(G, s, σ[σ′i], i) − ε. A strategy profile σ forms an ε-Nash
equilibrium if it forms an ε-Nash equilibrium from all states s. Also a strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium (resp.,
from state s, for some s) if it forms a 0-Nash equilibrium (resp., from state s). We say that a strategy profile has a
property (e.g., is stationary) if each of the strategies in the profile has that property.
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2.1 Zero-sum concurrent stochastic games
A zero-sum game consists of two players with complementary objectives. Since we only consider reachability and
safety objectives, a zero-sum concurrent stochastic game consists of a two-player concurrent stochastic game with
reachability objective for player 1 and the complementary safety objective for player 2 (such a game is also referred
to as concurrent reachability game).
Concurrent reachability game. A concurrent reachability game is a concurrent game with two players, identified by
(Reach, S1) and (Safety, S \ S1). Observe that in such games, exactly one player wins each play (this implies that
the games are zero-sum). Note that for all strategy profiles σ we have u(G, s, σ, 1) + u(G, s, σ, 2) = 1. For ease of
notation and tradition, we write u(G, s, σ1, σ2) for u(G, s, σ1, σ2, 1), for all concurrent reachability games G, states
s, and strategy profiles σ = (σ1, σ2). Also if the game G is clear from context we drop it from the notation.
Values of concurrent reachability games. Given a concurrent reachability game G, the upper value of G starting in
s is
val(G, s) = sup
σ1∈Σ1
inf
σ2∈Σ2
u(G, s, σ1, σ2) ;
and the lower value of G starting in s is
val(G, s) = inf
σ2∈Σ2
sup
σ1∈Σ1
u(G, s, σ1, σ2) .
As shown by [16] we have that
val(G, s) := val(G, s) = val(G, s) ;
and this common number is called the value of s. We will sometimes write val(s) for val(G, s) if G is clear from the
context. We will also write val for the vector where vals = val(s).
(ε-)optimal strategies for concurrent reachability games. For an ε ≥ 0, a strategy σ1 for player 1 (resp., σ2 for
player 2) is called ε-optimal if for each state s we have that val(s) − ε ≤ infσ2∈Σ2 u(s, σ1, σ2) (resp., val(s) + ε ≥
supσ1∈Σ1 u(s, σ1, σ2)). For each i, a strategy σi for player i is called optimal if it is 0-optimal. There exist concurrent
reachability games in which player 1 does not have optimal strategies, see [16] for an example2. On the other hand
in all games G player 1 has a stationary ε-optimal strategy for each ε > 0. In all games player 2 has an optimal
stationary strategy (thus also an ε-optimal stationary strategy for all ε > 0) [30, 23]. Also, given a stationary strategy
σ1 for player 1 we have that there exists a positional strategy σ2, such that u(s, σ1, σ2) = infσ′2∈Σ2 u(s, σ1, σ
′
2), i.e.,
we only need to consider positional strategies for player 2. Similarly, we only need to consider positional strategies
for player 1, if we are given a stationary strategy for player 2.
(ε-)optimal strategies compared to (ε-)Nash equilibria. It is well-known and easy to see that for concurrent reach-
ability games, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is optimal if and only if σ forms a Nash equilibrium. Also, if σ1 is
ε-optimal and σ2 is ε′-optimal, for some ε and ε′, then σ = (σ1, σ2) forms an (ε+ε′)-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
if σ = (σ1, σ2) forms an ε-Nash equilibrium, for some ε, then σ1 and σ2 are ε-optimal3.
Markov decision processes and Markov chains. For each player i, a Markov decision process (MDP) for player i is
a concurrent game where the size of Ajs is 1 for all s and j 6= i. A Markov chain is an MDP for each player (that is
the size of Ajs is 1 for all s and j). A closed recurrent set of a Markov chain G is a maximal (i.e., no closed recurrent
set is a subset of another) set S′ ⊆ S such that for all pairs of states s, s′ ∈ S, the play starting at s reaches state s′
eventually with probability 1 (note that it does not depend on the choices of the players as we have a Markov chain).
For all starting states, eventually a closed recurrent set is reached with probability 1, and then plays stay in the closed
recurrent set. Observe that fixing a stationary strategy for all but one player in a concurrent game, the resulting game
is an MDP for the remaining player. Hence, fixing a stationary strategy for each player gives a Markov chain.
2note that it is not because that we require the strategy to be optimal for each start state, since if there was one for each start state separately then
there would be one for all, since this is not just for stationary strategies
3observe that the two latter properties implies the former, but all are included to make it clear that there is a strong connection
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2.2 Matrix games and the value iteration algorithm
A (two-player, zero-sum) matrix game consists of a matrix M ∈ Rr×c. We will typically let M refer to both the
matrix game and the matrix and it should be clear from the context what it means. A matrix game M is played as
follows: player 1 selects a row a1 and at the same time, without knowing which row was selected by player 1, player 2
selects a column a2. The outcome is then Ma1,a2 . Player 1 then tries to maximize the outcome and player 2 tries to
minimize it.
Strategies in matrix games. A strategy σ1 (resp., σ2) for player 1 (resp., player 2) is a probability distribution over
the rows (resp., columns) of M . A strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is a pair of strategies, one for each player. Given a
strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) the payoff u(M,σ1, σ2) under those strategies is the expected outcome if player 1 picks
row a1 with probability σ1(a1) and player 2 picks column a2 with probability σ2(a2) for each a1 and a2, i.e.,
u(M,σ1, σ2) =
∑
a1
∑
a2
Ma1,a2 · σ1(a1) · σ2(a2) .
Values in matrix games. The upper value of a matrix game is val(M) = supσ1 infσ2 u(M,σ1, σ2). The lower value
of a matrix game is val(M) = infσ2 supσ1
∑
a1
u(M,σ1, σ2). One of the most fundamental results in game theory, as
shown by [37], is that val(M) := val(M) = val(M). This common number is called the value.
(ε-)optimal strategies in matrix games. A strategy σ1 for player 1 is ε-optimal, for some number ε ≥ 0 if val(M)−
ε ≤ infσ2 u(M,σ1, σ2). Similarly, a strategy σ2 for player 2 is ε-optimal, for some number ε ≥ 0 if val(M) + ε ≥
supσ1 u(M,σ1, σ2). A strategy is optimal if it is 0-optimal. There exists an optimal strategy for each player in all
matrix games [37]. Given an optimal strategy σ1 for player 1, consider the vector v, such that vj = u(M,σ1, j) for
each column j. Then we have that vj = val(M) for each j such that there exists an optimal strategy σ2 for player 2,
where σ2(j) > 0. Similar analysis holds for optimal strategies of player 2. This also shows that given an optimal
strategy σ1 for player 1 we have that u(M,σ1, σ2) is minimized for some pure strategy σ2 and similarly for optimal
strategies σ2 for player 2. Given a matrix game M , an optimal strategy for each player and the value of M can be
computed in polynomial time using linear programming.
The matrix game As[v] and As. Fix a concurrent reachability game G. Given a vector v in RS and a state s (in G),
the matrix game As[v] = [ai,j ] is the matrix game where ai,j =
∑
s′∈S δ(s, i, j)(s
′) · vs′ . Given a state s, the matrix
game As is the matrix game As[val]. As shown by [30, 23], each optimal stationary strategy σ2 for player 2 in G is
such that for each state s the distribution σ2(s) is an optimal strategy in the matrix gameAs. Also, conversely, if σ2(s)
is an optimal strategy in As for each s, then σ2 is an optimal stationary strategy in G. Furthermore, also as shown
by [30, 23], we have that val(s) = val(As) for each state s.
The value iteration algorithm. The conceptually simplest algorithm for concurrent reachability games is the value
iteration algorithm, which is an iterative approximation algorithm. The idea is as follows: Given a concurrent reacha-
bility game G, consider the game Gt where a time-limit t (some non-negative integer) has been introduced. The game
Gt is then played as G, except that player 2 wins if the time-limit is exceeded (i.e., he wins after round t unless a state
in S1 has been reached before that). (The game Gt has a value like in the above definition of matrix games since the
game only has a finite number of pure strategies and thus can be reduced to a matrix game). The value of Gt starting
in state s then converges to the value of G starting in s as t goes to infinity as shown by [16]. More precisely, the
algorithm is defined on a vector vt which is the vector where vts is the value of Gt starting in s. We can compute vts
recursively for increasing t as follows
vts =

1 if s ∈ S1
0 if s 6∈ S1 and t = 0
val(As[vt−1]) if s 6∈ S1 and t ≥ 1 .
We have that vts ≤ vt+1s ≤ val(s) for all t and s, and for all s we have limt→∞ vts = val(s), as shown by [16]. As
shown by [20, 21] the smallest time-limit t such that vts ≥ val(s) − ε can be as large as ε−m
Ω(N) for some games (of
N states and at most m actions in each state for each player) and s, for ε > 0. On the other hand it is also at most
ε−m
O(N2)
as shown by [20].
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3 Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Patience Lower Bound
In this section we will establish the doubly-exponential lower bound on patience for zero-sum concurrent stochastic
games. First we define the game family, namely, Purgatory Duel and we also recall the family Purgatory that will
be used in our proofs. We split our proof about the patience in Purgatory Duel in three parts. First we present some
refined analysis of matrix games, and use the analysis to first prove the lower bound for optimal strategies, and then
for ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0.
The Purgatory Duel. In this paper we specifically focus on the following concurrent reachability game, the
Purgatory Duel4, defined on a pair of parameters (n,m). The game consists of N = 2n + 3 states, namely
{v11 , v
1
2 , . . . , v
1
n, v
2
1 , v
2
2 , . . . , v
2
n, vs,⊤,⊥} and all but vs are deterministic. To simplify the definition of the game,
let v10 = v2n+1 = ⊥ and v20 = v1n+1 = ⊤. The states ⊤ and ⊥ are absorbing. For each i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
the state vij is such that A1vij = A
2
vij
= {1, 2, . . . ,m} and for each a1, a2 we have that
δ(vij , a1, a2) =

vs if a1 > a2
vi0 if a1 < a2
vij+1 if a1 = a2 .
Finally, A1vs = A
2
vs = {a} and δ(vs, a, a) = U(v
1
1 , v
2
1). Furthermore, S1 = {⊤}. There is an illustration of the
Purgatory Duel with m = n = 2 in Figure 6.
The game Purgatory. We will also use the game Purgatory as defined by [20] (and also in [22] for the case of
m = 2). Purgatory is similar to the Purgatory Duel and hence the similarity in names. Purgatory is also defined on a
pair of parameters (n,m). The game consists of N = n + 2 states, namely, {v1, v2, . . . , vn,⊤,⊥} and each state is
deterministic. To simplify the definition of the game, let vn+1 = ⊤. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the state vj is such that
A1vj = A
2
vj = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and for each a1, a2 we have that
δ(vj , a1, a2) =

v1 if a1 > a2
⊥ if a1 < a2
vj+1 if a1 = a2 .
The states ⊤ and ⊥ are absorbing. Furthermore, S1 = {⊤}. There is an illustration of Purgatory with m = n = 2 in
Figure 2.
3.1 Analysis of matrix games
In this section we present some refined analysis of some simple matrix games, which we use in the later sections to
find optimal strategies for the players and the values of the states in the Purgatory Duel.
Definition 1. Given a positive integer m and reals x, y and z, let Mx,y,z,m be the (m×m)-matrix with x below the
diagonal, y in the diagonal and z above the diagonal, i.e.,
Mx,y,z,m =

y z z . . . z
x y z . . . z
.
.
. x
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
x
.
.
.
.
.
. y z
x x . . . x y
 .
We first explain the significance of the matrix gameMx,y,z,m in relation to Purgatory Duel. Consider the Purgatory
Duel defined on parameters (n,m), for some n. We will later establish that for any j, let v (resp., v′) be state v1j (resp.,
4To allow a more compact notation, we have here exchanged the criterias for when the safety player wins as a guard and when the escape attempt
ends, as compared to the textual description of the game given in the introduction.
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⊤v12
v11
vs
v21
v22
⊥
Figure 1: An illustration of the Purgatory Duel with m = n = 2. The two dashed edges have probability 12 each.
10
⊤v2
v1
⊥
Figure 2: An illustration of Purgatory with m = n = 2.
v2j ) of the Purgatory Duel, then we have that Av = M0,val(v
1
j+1),val(vs),m (resp., Av′ = M1,val(v2j+1),val(vs),m). In
this section we show that for 0 < z < y we have that M = M0,y,z,m is such that val(M) > z and each optimal
strategy for either player is totally mixed. Similarly, for 1 > z′ > y′ we show that M ′ = M1,y′,z′,m is such that
val(M ′) < z and each optimal strategy for either player is totally mixed. We also compute the value and the patience
of each optimal strategy in the matrix game M0, 12+ε, 12 ,m (since we will establish in the next section, using the results
of this section, that val(vs) = 12 and val(v
1
j ) > val(s) for all j).
Lemma 2. For all positive integers m and reals y and z such that 0 < z < y, the matrix game M = M0,y,z,m has
value strictly above z.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be some number to be defined later. Consider the probability distribution σε1 given by
σε1(a) =
{
εa−1 − εa if 1 ≤ a ≤ m− 1
εm−1 if a = m .
If player 2 plays column a against σ1, for a ≤ m− 1, then the payoff u(M,σ1, a) is y · (εa−1 − εa) + y · (1− εa−1);
and if player 2 plays column m, then the payoff u(M,σ1,m) is y · (εm−1) + z · (1 − εm−1). For any ε such that
y · (1− ε) > z, the payoff is strictly greater than z implying that the value of M is strictly greater than z.
Lemma 3. For all positive integers m and reals y and z such that 0 < z < y, each optimal strategy for player 1 in
the matrix game M0,y,z,m is totally mixed.
Proof. Consider some strategy σ1 for player 1 in M0,y,z,m which is not totally mixed. Thus there exists some row a,
where σ1(a) = 0. Consider the pure strategy σ2 that plays column a with probability 1. Playing σ1 against σ2 ensures
that each outcome is either z or 0, i.e., the payoff is at most z which is strictly less than the value by Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. For all positive integers m and reals y and z such that 0 < z < y, each optimal strategy for player 2 in
the matrix game M = M0,y,z,m is totally mixed.
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Proof. Given a strategy σ1 for player 1 and two rows a′ and a′′, let the strategy σ1[a′ → a′′] be the strategy where the
probability mass on a′ is moved to a′′, i.e.,
σ1[a
′ → a′′](a) =

σ1(a) if a′ 6= a 6= a′′
0 if a = a′
σ1(a
′) + σ1(a
′′) if a = a′′ .
Consider some optimal totally mixed strategy σ1 for player 1, which exists by Lemma 3 and let v be the value of
M . Consider some strategy σ2 for player 2 such that u(M,σ1, σ2) = v, but σ2 is not totally mixed. We will argue that
σ2 is not optimal. This shows that any optimal strategy σ∗2 is totally mixed, since any optimal strategy σ2 is such that
u(M,σ1, σ2) = v.
Let b′ be the first column such that σ′2(b) = 0. There are two cases, either b′ = 1 or b′ > 1. If b′ = 1 let b′′ be the
first action such that σ2(b′′) > 0. Let σ′1 = σ1[b′ → b′′]. The payoff u(M,σ′1, σ2) of playing σ′1 against σ2 is strictly
more than the payoff u(M,σ1, σ2) of playing σ1 against σ2. This is because the payoff u(M,σ′1, b′′) is such that
u(M,σ′1, b
′′) = σ′1(b
′′) · y + z ·
b′′−1∑
a=1
σ′1(a)
= σ′1(b
′′) · y + z ·
b′′−1∑
a=2
σ′1(a)
= (σ1(b
′′) + σ1(1)) · y + z ·
b′′−1∑
a=2
σ′1(a)
> σ1(b
′′) · y + z ·
b′′−1∑
a=1
σ1(a)
= u(M,σ1, b
′′) ,
where the second equality comes from that σ′1(1) = 0. The inequality comes from that y > z. Also, the payoff
u(M,σ′1, b), for b > b′′ is such that
u(M,σ′1, b) = σ
′
1(b) · y + z ·
b−1∑
a=1
σ′1(a)
= σ1(b) · y + z ·
b−1∑
a=1
σ1(a) = u(M,σ1, b) ,
because σ′1 is not different from σ1 on those actions. We can then find the payoff u(M,σ′1, σ2) as follows
u(M,σ′1, σ2) =
m∑
b=1
σ2(b) · u(M,σ
′
1, b)
=
m∑
b=b′′
σ2(b) · u(M,σ
′
1, b)
= σ2(b
′′) · u(M,σ′1, b
′′) +
m∑
b=b′′+1
σ2(b) · u(M,σ
′
1, b)
> σ2(b
′′) · u(M,σ1, b
′′) +
m∑
b=b′′+1
σ2(b) · u(M,σ1, b)
= u(M,σ1, σ2) ,
12
where the second equality comes from that b′′ is the first action σ2 plays with positive probability. Since the payoff
u(M,σ1, σ2) is the value, by definition of σ2, and the payoff u(M,σ′1, σ2) is strictly more, the strategy σ2 cannot be
optimal. This completes the case where b′ = 1.
The case where b′ 6= 1 follows similarly but considers σ′′1 = σ1[b′ → 1] instead of σ′1.
Lemma 5. For all positive integers m and 0 < ε ≤ 12 , the matrix game M = M
0, 12+ε,
1
2 ,m has the following
properties:
• Property 1. The patience of any optimal strategy is (i) at least (2ε)−m+1 and (ii) decreasing in ε.
• Property 2. The value is (i) at most 12 + ε · (2ε)m−1 and (ii) increasing in ε.
• Property 3. Any optimal strategy σ1 for player 1 (resp., σ2 for player 2) is such that σ1(1) > 12 (resp.,
σ2(m) >
1
2 ).
• Property 4. For ε = 12 , the value is val(M) =
1
2 +
1
2m+1−2 and the patience of any optimal strategy is 2m − 1.
Proof. Let σi be an optimal strategy for player i in M , for each i. By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 the strategy σi is totally
mixed for each i. We can therefore consider the vector v. Recall that vj = u(M,σ1, j) and that for each j such that
σ2(j) > 0 we have that vj = val(M). Hence, since σ2 is totally mixed, all entries of M are val(M). For any row
a′ < m, that va′ = va′+1 implies that
(
1
2
+ ε) · σ1(a
′) +
1
2
·
a′−1∑
a=1
σ1(a)
= (
1
2
+ ε) · σ1(a
′ + 1) +
1
2
·
a′∑
a=1
σ1(a)⇒
ε · σ1(a
′) = (
1
2
+ ε) · σ1(a
′ + 1)⇒
σ1(a
′) =
1
2 + ε
ε
· σ1(a
′ + 1) ,
indicating that σ1(a′) > σ1(a′ + 1) and thus the patience is 1/σ1(m). Also, since σ1 is a probability distribution
1 =
m∑
a=1
σ1(a)
= σ1(m) ·
m∑
a=1
( 1
2 + ε
ε
)m−a
We then get that
σ1(m) =
1∑m
a=1
(
1
2+ε
ε
)m−a
We have that
1
2+ε
ε = 1 +
1
2ε is decreasing in ε. This indicates that σ1(m) is increasing in ε and thus the patience is
decreasing in ε. This shows (ii) of Property 1 for player 1. We also have that val(M) = vm indicating that
val(M) = vm
= σ1(m) · (
1
2
+ ε) +
1
2
·
m−1∑
a=1
σ1(a)
= ε · σ1(m) +
1
2
and thus, the value is increasing in ε (because ε and σ1(m) both are). This shows (ii) of Property 2.
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Also, we get that,
σ1(m) =
1∑m
a=1
(
1
2+ε
ε
)m−a
=
εm−1∑m
a=1(
1
2 + ε)
m−a · εa−1
=
εm−1(
1
2
)m−1
+ ε · p(ε)
,
where p is some polynomial of degree m − 1 in which all terms have a positive sign (p is found by multiplying out∑m
a=1(
1
2 + ε)
m−a · εa−1). Hence, we have that σ1(m) is at most
σ1(m) =
εm−1(
1
2
)m−1
+ ε · p(ε)
< (2ε)m−1 .
Thus, the patience is at least (2ε)−m+1. This shows (i) of Property 1 for player 1. Using that val(M) = ε ·σ1(m)+ 12
from above, we get that val(M) < 12 + ε · (2ε)
m−1
. This shows (i) of Property 2.
Furthermore, we can also consider the vector v′ such that v′j = u(M, j, σ2) for all j (which like v has all entries
equal to val(M)). Since the expression, when σ2 is taken to be an unknown vector, for the j’th entry of v′ is the same
as for the m + 1 − j’th entry of v, when σ1 is taken to be an unknown vector, we see that σ1(a) = σ2(m + 1 − a),
implying that the patience of player 2’s optimal strategies is also at least (2ε)−m+1 and that it is decreasing in ε. This
shows Property 1 for player 2.
Observe that since the value is above 12 , by Lemma 2, we have that σ1(1) >
1
2 (because otherwise, if player 2
plays 1 with probability 1, the payoff will not be above 12 ) and thus also σ2(m) > 12 . This shows Property 3.
Also, for ε = 12 we see that
σ1(m) =
1∑m
a=1
(
1
2+ε
ε
)m−a
=
1∑m
a=1 2
m−a
=
1
2m − 1
.
Similarly to above, we also get that σ2(m) = 12m−1 and that val(M) =
1
2 +
1
2m+1−2 . This shows Property 4 and
completes the proof.
Lemma 6. Given a positive integer m and reals y and z such that 1 > z > y, the matrix game M = M1,y,z,m has
the following properties:
• The value val(M) < z.
• Each optimal strategy σi for player i is such that there exists an optimal strategy σ̂i for player î in M0,1−y,1−z,m
where σi(j) = σ̂i(m− j + 1).
Proof. Let a positive integer m and reals y and z such that 1 > z > y be given. Consider M and let v be the value of
M . Exchange the roles of the players by exchanging the rows and columns and multiply the matrix by−1. We get the
matrix
M1 =

−y −1 −1 . . . −1
−z −y −1 . . . −1
.
.
. −z
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−z
.
.
.
.
.
. −y −1
−z −z . . . −z −y
 .
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We then have that each optimal strategy σ1 in M is an optimal strategy for player 2 in M1 and similarly, each optimal
strategy σ2 for player 2 in M is an optimal strategy for player 1 in M1 (and vice versa). Also, the value v1 of M1 is
v1 := −v.
Let M2 be the matrix where M2a,b =M1m+1−a,m+1−b, i.e.,
M2 =

−y −z −z . . . −z
−1 −y −z . . . −z
.
.
. −1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−1
.
.
.
.
.
. −y −z
−1 −1 . . . −1 −y
 .
For each i, and for any optimal strategy σi for player i in M1 the strategy σ′i is optimal for player i in M2, where
σ′i(a) = σi(m+ 1− a) for each a (and vice versa). Also, the value v2 of M2 is v2 := v1 = −v.
Next, let M3 be the matrix M2 where we add 1 to each entry, i.e.,
M3 =

1− y 1− z 1− z . . . 1− z
0 1− y 1− z . . . 1− z
.
.
. 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
.
.
.
.
.
. 1− y 1− z
0 0 . . . 0 1− y
 .
For each i, it is clear that an optimal strategy in σi for player i in M2 is an optimal strategy for player i in M3 and that
the value v3 is v3 := 1 + v2 = 1− v. Also, we see that M3 = M0,1−y,1−z,m and that 0 < 1− z < 1− y.
We then get that 1− v > 1− z from Lemma 2 and thus v < z.
3.2 The patience of optimal strategies
In this section we present an approximation of the values of the states and the patience of the optimal strategies in the
Purgatory Duel. We first show that the values of the states (besides ⊤ and ⊥) are strictly between 0 and 1.
Lemma 7. Each state
v ∈ {v11 , v
1
2 , . . . , v
1
n, v
2
1 , v
2
2 , . . . , v
1
2 , vs}
is such that val(v) ∈ [ 1mn+2 , 1−
1
mn+2 ]
Proof. Fix v ∈ {v11 , v12 , . . . , v1n, v21 , v22 , . . . , v12 , vs}. The fact that val(v) ≥ 1mn+2 follows from that if player 1 plays
uniformly at random all actions in every state vij for all i, j, then against all strategies for player 2 there is a probability
of at least 1m to go (1) from v1j to v1j+1, for all j; and (2) from vs to v11 ; and (3) from v2j to vs, for all j. By following
such steps for at most n + 2 steps, the state v1n+1 = ⊤ is reached. Similarly that val(v) ≤ 1 − 1mn+2 follows from
player 2 playing uniformly at random all actions in every state vij for all i, j (and using that ⊤ cannot be reached from
⊥).
Next we show that every optimal stationary strategy for player 2 must be totally mixed.
Lemma 8. Let σ2 be an optimal stationary strategy for player 2. The distribution σ2(vij) is totally mixed and val(v1j ) >
val(vs) > val(v2j ), for all i, j.
Proof. Let v = vij for some i, j. We will use that val(v) = val(Av). For i = 1 we have that Av =
M0,val(v
1
j+1),val(vs),m and for i = 2 we have that Av = M1,val(v
2
j+1),val(vs),m
.
Consider first i = 1. We will show using induction in j (with base case j = n and proceeding downwards), that
val(v1j ) > val(vs) and that the distribution σ2(v1j ) is totally mixed.
Base case, j = n: We have that Av = M0,1,val(vs),m. By Lemma 7 we have that 1 > val(vs) > 0 and thus, that
val(v) > val(vs) follows from Lemma 2. That σ2(v) is totally mixed follows from Lemma 4.
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Induction case, j ≤ n − 1: We have that Av = M0,val(v
1
j+1),val(vs),m
. By Lemma 7 we have that val(vs) > 0
and by induction we have that val(v1j+1) > val(vs) and thus, that val(v) > val(vs) follows from Lemma 2. That σ2(v)
is totally mixed follows from Lemma 4.
The argument for i = 2 is similar but uses Lemma 6 together with Lemma 3, instead of Lemma 4 and Lemma 2.
Next, we show that if either player follows a stationary strategy that is totally mixed on at least one side (that is, if
there is an i′, such that for each j the stationary strategy plays totally mixed in vi′j ), then eventually either ⊤ or ⊥ is
reached with probability 1.
Lemma 9. For any i and i′, let σi be a stationary strategy for player i, such that σi(vi′j ) is totally mixed for all j. Let
σ̂i be some positional strategy for the other player. Then, each closed recurrent set in the Markov chain defined by the
game and σi and σ̂i consists of only the state ⊤ or only the state ⊥.
Proof. In the Markov chain defined by the game and σi and σ̂i, we have that there are at most two closed recurrent
sets, namely, the one consisting of only ⊤ and the one consisting of only ⊥. The reasoning is as follows: If either ⊤
or ⊥ is reached, then the respective state will not be left. Also, for each j, since σi is totally mixed there is a positive
probability to go to either vi′0 or vi
′
j+1 from vi
′
j (the remaining probability goes to vs). The probability to go from vs
to vi
′
1 in one step is 12 . Also if neither ⊤ nor ⊥ has been reached, then vs is visited after at most n + 1 steps. Hence,
in every n+ 1 steps there is a positive probability that in the next n + 1 steps either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached (i.e., from vs
there is a positive probability that the next states are either (i) vi′1 , . . . , vi
′
j , v
i′
0 ; or (ii) vi
′
1 , . . . , v
i′
n , v
i′
n+1). This shows
that eventually either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached with probability 1.
Remark 10. Note that Lemma 9 only requires that the strategy σi is totally mixed on one “side” of the Purgatory
Duel. For the purpose of this section, we do not use that it only requires one side to be totally mixed, since we only use
the result for optimal strategies for player 2, which are totally mixed by Lemma 8. However the lemma will be reused
in the next section, where the one sidedness property will be useful.
The following definition basically “mirrors” a strategy σi for player i, for each i and gives it to the other player.
We show (in Lemma 12) that if σ2 is optimal for player 2, then the mirror strategy is optimal for player 1. We also
show that if σ2 is an ε-optimal strategy for player 2, for 0 < ε < 13 , then so is the mirror strategy for player 1 (in
Lemma 16).
Definition 11 (Mirror strategy). Given a stationary strategy σi for player i, for either i, let the mirror strategy σσiî for
player î be the stationary strategy where σσi
î
(vî
′
j ) = σi(v
i′
j ) for each i′ and j.
We next show that player 1 has optimal stationary strategies in the Purgatory Duel and give expressions for the
values of states.
Lemma 12. Let σ2 be some optimal stationary strategy for player 2. Then the mirror strategy σσ21 is optimal for
player 1. We have val(vs) = 12 and val(v
i
j) = 1− val(vîj), for all i, j.
Proof. Consider some optimal stationary strategy σ2 for player 2. It is thus totally mixed, by Lemma 8. Let σ1 = σσ21
be the mirror strategy for player 1.
Playing σ1 against σ2 and starting in vs we see that we have probability 12 to reach ⊤ and probability
1
2 to reach
⊥, by symmetry and Lemma 9. This shows that the value is at least 12 because σ2 is optimal. On the other hand,
consider some stationary strategy σ′1 for player 1, and the mirror strategy σ′2 = σ
σ′1
2 for player 2. If player 2 plays
σ′2 against σ′1, then the probability to eventually reach ⊥ is equal to the probability to eventually reach ⊤ and then
there is some probability p (perhaps 0) that neither will be reached. The payoff u(vs, σ′1, σ′2, 1) is then 1−p2 ≤ 12 . This
shows that player 1 cannot ensure value strictly more than 12 , which is then the value of vs. Finally, we argue that σ1
is optimal. If not, then consider σ∗2 such that u(vs, σ1, σ∗2 , 1) < 1/2, and then the mirror strategy σ∗1 = σ
σ∗2
1 ensures
that u(vs, σ∗1 , σ2, 1) > 1/2 contradicting optimality of σ2.
Similarly, for any i, j, playing σ1 against σ2 and starting in vij we see that the probability with which we reach ⊤
is equal to the probability of reaching⊥ starting in vîj and vice versa, by symmetry. Also, by Lemma 9 the probability
to eventually reach either ⊥ or ⊤ is 1. Observe that the probability to reach ⊥ starting in vîj is at least 1 − val(vîj), by
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optimality of σ2 and that with probability 1 either ⊥ is reached or⊤ is reached. Also, again because σ2 is optimal, the
probability to reach ⊤ starting in vij is at most val(vij). This shows that val(vij) ≥ 1− val(vîj). Using an argument like
the one above, we obtain that val(vij) = 1− val(vîj) and that σ1 is optimal if the play starts in vij .
Finally, we give an approximation of the values of states in the Purgatory Duel and a lower bound on the patience
of any optimal strategy of 2(m−1)2mn−2 .
Theorem 13. For each j in {1, . . . , n}, the value of state v1j in the Purgatory Duel is less than 12 + 2(1−m)·m
n−j−1
and for any optimal stationary strategy σi for either player i, the patience of σi(v1j ) is at least 2(m−1)
2mn−j−1
.
Proof. Consider some optimal stationary strategy σ2 for player 2. We will show using induction in j that val(v1j ) is
less than 12 + 2
(1−m)·mn−j−1 and that the patience of σ2(v1j ) is at least 2(m−1)
2mn−j−1
. Note that using Lemma 12, a
similar result holds for optimal strategies for player 1. Let v = vij .
Base case, j = n: We see that the matrix Av is M0,1, 12 ,m and thus, by Lemma 5 (Property 1 and 2) we have that
the value
val(v) = val(Av)
=
1
2
+
1
2m+1 − 2
<
1
2
+ 2−m
=
1
2
+ 2(1−m)·m
0−1 ,
and σ2(v) has patience 2m − 1 > 2(m−1)
2·m−1
.
Induction case, j ≤ n − 1: We see that the matrix Av is M = M0,val(v
i
j+1),
1
2 ,m
. By induction we have that
val(vij+1) < 12 + 2
(1−m)·mn−j−1−1
. Let ε = 2(1−m)·m
n−j−1−1 and consider M ′ = M0, 12+ε, 12 ,m. By Lemma 5
(Property 1 and 2) we get that val(M ′) ≥ val(M) and that the patience of M ′ is smaller than the one for M . Also, we
get that
val(M ′) < 1
2
+ ε · (2ε)m−1
=
1
2
+ 2m−1 · 2(1−m)·m
n−j−m
=
1
2
+ 2(1−m)·m
n−j−1 ,
and that the patience of M ′ (and thus M ) is at least
(2ε)−m+1 = 2m−1 · 2(1−m)
2·mn−j−1−m+1
= 2(1−m)
2·mn−j−1 .
This completes the proof.
Remark 14. It can be seen using induction that the value of each state in the Purgatory Duel is a rational number.
First notice that v1n and v2n are the value of a matrix game with numbers in {0, 12 , 1} and hence are rational. Similarly,
using induction in i, we see that for j ∈ {1, 2} the number vji is rational, since it is the value of a matrix game with
numbers in {vj0, 12 , v
j
i+1} (recall that v10 = 0 and v20 = 1).
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3.3 The patience of ε-optimal strategies
In this section we consider the patience of ε-optimal strategies for 0 < ε < 13 . First we argue that each such strategy
for player 2 is totally mixed on one side.
Lemma 15. For all 0 < ε < 12 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy σ2 for player 2 is such that σ2(v2j ) is totally mixed,for all j.
Proof. Fix 0 < ε < 12 and fix some stationary strategy σ2 such that there exists j such that σ2(v2j ) is not totally mixed.
We will show that σ2 is not ε-optimal.
Let η be such that 0 < η < 12 − ε. Let a be an action such that σ2(v
2
j )(a) = 0. Let σ
η
1 be an η-optimal
strategy in Purgatory (not the Purgatory Duel) (with the same parameters n and m). Let σ1 be the strategy such that
(i) σ1(v2j′ )(1) = 1 for each j′; and (ii) σ1(v2j )(a) = 1; and (iii) σ1(v1j ) = ση1 (vj). Consider a play starting in vs.
Whenever the play is in state v2j′ , for some j′ 6= j in each step there is a probability of either going back to vs or going
to v2j′+1. Thus, the play either reaches v2j or has gone back to vs. If it reaches v2j , then the next state is either vs or
⊤ (i.e., v2j+1 cannot be reached). If the play is in v11 , then there is a positive probability to reach ⊤ before going back
to vs, which is at least 1−ηη times the probability to reach ⊥ before going back to vs, since σ1 follows an η-optimal
strategy in Purgatory. Hence, the probability to eventually reach ⊤ is at least 1 − η > 12 + ε and thus σ2 is not
ε-optimal, since the value of vs is 12 by Lemma 7.
We now show that if we mirror an ε-optimal strategy, then we get an ε-optimal strategy.
Lemma 16. For all 0 < ε < 13 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy σ2 for player 2 in the Purgatory Duel, is such that
the mirror strategy σσ21 is ε-optimal for player 1.
Proof. Fix 0 < ε < 13 and let σ2 be some ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2. Also, let σ1 = σσ21 be the mirror
strategy.
By Lemma 15 the strategy σ2 is such that σ2(v2j ) is totally mixed, for all j. We can then apply Lemma 9 and get
that either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached with probability 1. Hence, since σ2 is ε-optimal we reach ⊥ with probability at least
1 − val(v) − ε starting in v against all strategies for player 1, for each v. It is clear that any play P of σ2 against any
given strategy σ′1 for player 1 starting in v corresponds, by symmetry, to a play P ′ of σ
σ′1
2 against σ1 starting in f(v),
where
f(v) =

vs if v = vs
vîj if v = vij
⊥ if v = ⊤
⊤ if v = ⊥ ,
such that in round i we have thatPi = f(P ′i ) and the plays are equally likely. Thus, the probability to reach f(⊥) = ⊤,
starting in state f(v), for each v is at least 1−val(v)−ε = val(f(v))−ε, where the equality follows from Lemma 12.
Hence, σ1 is ε-optimal for player 1.
Next we give a definition and a lemma, which is similar to Lemma 6 in [25]. The purpose of the lemma is to
identify certain cases where one can change the transition function of an MDP in a specific way and obtain a new
MDP with larger values. We cannot simply obtain the result from Lemma 6 in [25], since the direction is opposite
(i.e., Lemma 6 in [25] considers some cases where one can change the transition function and obtain a new MDP with
smaller values) and our lemma is also for a slightly more general class of MDPs.
Definition 17. Let G be an MDP with safety objectives. A replacement set is a set of triples of states, actions and
distributions over the states Q = {(s1, a1, δ1), . . . , (sℓ, aℓ, δℓ)}. Given the replacement set Q, the MDP G[Q] is an
MDP over the same states as G and with the same set of safe states, but where the transition function δ′ is
δ′(s, a) =
{
δi if s = si and a = ai for some i
δ(s, a) otherwise
18
Lemma 18. Let G be an MDP with safety objectives. Consider some replacement set
Q = {(s1, a1, δ1), . . . , (sℓ, aℓ, δℓ)} ,
such that for all t and i we have that ∑
s∈S
(δ(si, ai)(s) · v
t
s) ≤
∑
s∈S
(δi(s) · v
t
s) .
Let v′t be the value vector for G[Q] with finite horizon t. (1) For all states s and time limits t we have that
vts ≤ v
′t
s .
(2) For all states s, we have that
val(G, s) ≤ val(G[Q], s) .
Proof. We first present the proof of first item. We will show, using induction in t, that vts ≤ v′ts for all s. Let δ′ be the
transition function for G[Q].
Base case, t = 0: Consider some state s. Clearly we have that vts = v′
t
s because we have not changed the safe
states.
Induction case, t ≥ 1: The induction hypothesis state that vt−1s ≤ v′
t−1
s for all s. Consider some state s. Consider
any action a′ such that there is an i such that s = si and a = ai. We have that∑
s′
(δ(s, a′)(s′) · vt−1s′ ) ≤
∑
s′
(δ′(s, a′)(s′) · vt−1s′ )
by definition for such a′ (the statement is true for all time limits and thus also for t − 1). For all other actions a′′ we
have that ∑
s′
(δ(s, a′′)(s′) · vt−1s′ ) =
∑
s′
(δ′(s, a′′)(s′) · vt−1s′ ) ,
since δ(s, a′′) = δ′(s, a′′). Hence,
min
a
∑
s′
(δ(s, a)(s′) · vt−1s′ ) ≤ mina
∑
s′
(δ′(s, a)(s′) · vt−1s′ )
We then have, using the recursive definition of vts, that
vts = min
a
∑
s′
(δ(s, a)(s′) · vt−1s′ )
≤ min
a
∑
s′
(δ′(s, a)(s′) · vt−1s′ )
≤ min
a
∑
s′
(δ′(s, a)(s′) · v′
t−1
s′ )
= v′
t
s .
where we just argued the first inequality; and the second inequality comes from the induction hypothesis and that each
factor is positive. (Note that the optimal strategy for player 2 in a matrix game As[vt−1] of 1 row is to pick one of the
columns with the smallest entry with probability 1 and thus vts = val(As[vt−1]) = mina
∑
s′(δ(s, a)(s
′) · vt−1s′ ) and
similarly for v′ts). This completes the proof of the first item. The second item follows from the first item and since
the value of a time limited game goes to the value of the game without the time limit as the time limit grows to ∞, as
shown by [16].
We next show that for player 1, the patience of ε-optimal strategies is high.
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Lemma 19. For all 0 < ε < 13 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy σ1 for player 1 in the Purgatory Duel has patience
at least 2mΩ(n) . For N = 5 the patience is 2Ω(m).
Proof. Consider some ε-optimal stationary strategy σ1 for player 1 in the Purgatory Duel. Fixing σ1 for player 1 in the
Purgatory Duel we obtain an MDP G′ for player 2. Let vt be the value vector for G′ with finite horizon (time-limit) t
and let δ be the transition function for G′. For each i, let
δi(s) =

δ(v2n, i)(s) if vs 6= s 6= ⊥
δ(v2n, i)(⊥) + δ(v
2
n, i)(vs) if vs = s
0 if ⊥ = s
(Note that δi is the same probability distribution as δ(v2n, i), except that the probability mass on ⊥ is moved to vs.)
Consider the replacement set Q = {(v2n, 1, δ1), . . . , (v2n,m, δm)} and the MDP G′[Q]. We have for all t and i that∑
s∈S
(δ(v2n, i)(s) · v
t
s) ≤
∑
s∈S
(δi(s) · v
t
s)
because
vt⊥ = v
t
v2n+1
= 0 ≤ vtvs
for all t and the only difference between δ(v2n, i) and δi is that the probability mass on ⊥ is moved to vs. We then get
from Lemma 18(2) that val(G′, vs) ≤ val(G′[Q], vs). Let σ2 be an optimal positional strategy in G′[Q]. It is easy to
see that σ2 plays action 1 in v2j for all j, because the best player 2 can hope for is to get back to vs since ⊥ cannot be
reached from v2j in G′[Q] for any j and if he plays some action which is not 1, then there is a positive probability that
⊤ will be reached in one step. Thus, the MDP G′[Q] corresponds to the MDP one gets by fixing the strategy σ′1 where
σ′1(vi) = σ1(v
1
i ) for player 1 in Purgatory. But the probability to reach ⊤ in G′[Q] is at least 12 − ε and hence σ
′
1 is
(12 + ε)-optimal in Purgatory (note that this is Purgatory and not Purgatory Duel). As shown by [20] any such strategy
requires patience 2mΩ(n) . Thus, any ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 1 in the Purgatory Duel requires patience
2m
Ω(n)
.
It was shown by [20] that the patience of ε-optimal strategies for Purgatory with n = 1 Purgatory state is 2Ω(m),
and thus similarly for the Purgatory Duel with N = 5.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 20. For all 0 < ε < 13 , every ε-optimal stationary strategy, for either player, in the Purgatory Duel (that has
N = 2n+ 3 states and at most m actions for each player at all states) has patience 2mΩ(n) . For N = 5 the patience
is 2Ω(m).
Proof. The statement for strategies for player 1 follows from Lemma 19. By Lemma 16, for each ε-optimal strategy
for player 2, there is an ε-optimal strategy for player 1 (i.e., the mirror strategy) with the same patience. Thus the
result follows for strategies for player 2.
4 Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Patience Lower Bound for
Three States
In this section we show that the patience of all ε-optimal strategies, for all 0 < ε < 13 , for both players in a concurrent
reachability game G with three states of which two are absorbing, and the non-absorbing state has m actions for each
player, can be as large as 2Ω(m). The proof consists of two phases, first we show the lower bound in a game with at
most m2 actions for each player; and second, we show that all but 2m− 1 actions can be removed for both players in
the game without changing the patience.
The first game, the 3-state Purgatory Duel, is intuitively speaking the Purgatory Duel forN = 5, where we replace
the states v11 , v21 and vs with a state v′s while in essence keeping the same set of ε-optimal strategies. The idea is to
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ensure that one step in the 3-state Purgatory Duel corresponds to two steps in the Purgatory Duel with N = 5, by
having the players pick all the actions they might use in the next two steps at once. The game is formally defined as
follows:
The 3-state Purgatory Duel consists of N = 3 states, named v′s,⊤′ and ⊥′ respectively. The states ⊤′ and ⊥′ are
absorbing. The state v′s is such that
A1v′s = A
2
v′s
= {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m} .
Also, let δ′ be the transition function for the Purgatory Duel with N = 5. Let p be the function that given a state in
{vs,⊥,⊤} in the Purgatory Duel for i = 1 outputs the primed state (which is then a state in the 3-state Purgatory Duel).
Recall that U(s, s′) is the uniform distribution over s and s′. Observe that the deterministic distributions δ′(v11 , a1, a2)
and δ′(v21 , a1, a2) are in {vs,⊤,⊥} for all a1 and a2. For each pair of actions (a11, a21) ∈ A1v′s and (a
1
2, a
2
2) ∈ A
2
v′s
in
the 3-state Purgatory Duel, we have that
δ(v′s, (a
1
1, a
2
1), (a
1
2, a
2
2)) =
U(p(δ′(v11 , a
1
1, a
1
2)), p(δ
′(v21 , a
2
1, a
2
2))) .
To make the game easier to understand on its own, we now give a more elaborate description of the transition function
δ without using the transition function for the Purgatory Duel. To make the pattern as clear as possible we write U(s, s)
instead of s for all s.
δ(v′s, (a
1
1, a
2
1), (a
1
2, a
2
2)) =
U(⊥′,⊤′) if a11 > a12 and a21 > a22
U(⊥′,⊥′) if a11 > a12 and a21 = a22
U(⊥′, v′s) if a11 > a12 and a21 < a22
U(⊤′,⊤′) if a11 = a12 and a21 > a22
U(⊤′,⊥′) if a11 = a12 and a21 = a22
U(⊤′, v′s) if a11 = a12 and a21 < a22
U(v′s,⊤
′) if a11 < a12 and a21 > a22
U(v′s,⊥
′) if a11 < a12 and a21 = a22
U(v′s, v
′
s) if a11 < a12 and a21 < a22 .
Furthermore,S1 = {⊤′}. We will use τi for strategies in the 3-state Purgatory Duel to distinguish them from strategies
in the Purgatory Duel. There is an illustration of the Purgatory Duel with N = 5 and m = 2 in Figure 3 and the
corresponding 3-state Purgatory Duel in Figure 4.
Given a strategy τi for player i in the 3-state Purgatory Duel we define the strategy σi in the Purgatory Duel with
N = 5 which is the projection of τi and vice versa (note that the other direction maps to a set of strategies).
Definition 21. Given a strategy τi for player i in the 3-state Purgatory Duel, let στii be the stationary strategy for
player i in the Purgatory Duel with N = 5 where
στii (v
1
1)(a
1
1) =
∑
a21
τi(v
′
s)(a
1
1, a
2
1)
and
στii (v
2
1)(a
2
1) =
∑
a11
τi(v
′
s)(a
1
1, a
2
1) .
Also, for any stationary strategy σi in the Purgatory Duel with N = 5, let T σii be the set of stationary strategies in the
3-state Purgatory Duel such that τi ∈ T σii implies that σ
τi
i = σi.
Lemma 22. Consider any ε ≥ 0. Let G be the Purgatory Duel with N = 5 and G′ be the 3-state Purgatory Duel. For
any ε-optimal stationary strategy τi for player i in G′, we have that στii is ε-optimal starting in vs in G. Similarly, for
any ε-optimal stationary strategy σi in G starting in vs each strategy in T σii is ε-optimal in G′. Also, val(v′s) = 12 .
21
⊤v11
vs
v21
⊥
Figure 3: An illustration of the Purgatory Duel with N = 5 and m = 2. The two dashed edge have probability 12 each.
⊤′
v′s
⊥′
Figure 4: An illustration of the 3-state Purgatory Duel m = 2. The non-dashed edges have probability 12 each. The
order of the actions is (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2). The actions (i.e., (2, 2) for player 1 and (1, 1) for player 2) with
white background cannot be played in a restricted strategy.
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Proof. Consider some pair of strategies τi and στii for player i in G′ and G, respectively. Fixing τi and στii as the
strategy for player i we get two MDPs H ′ and H , respectively. We will argue that val(H ′, v′s) = val(H, vs). Let v′
t
and vt be the vector of values for the value iteration algorithm in iteration t when run on H ′ and H respectively (i.e.,
the values of H ′ and H with time limit t). We have that v2tvs = v′
t
v′s
by definition of the value-iteration algorithm and
the transition function in the 3-state Purgatory Duel. Hence, since v2tvs and v′
t
v′s
converges to the value of state vs and
v′s in H and H ′ respectively, they have the same value. We know that the value of vs is 12 and thus that is also the
value of v′s.
Corollary 23. The patience of ε-optimal stationary strategies for both players, for 0 < ε < 13 , in the 3-state Purgatory
Duel is at least 2Ω(m), where m2 is the number of actions in state vs.
Proof. The patience of ε-optimal strategies, for 0 < ε < 13 , in the Purgatory Duel with N = 5 is 2Ω(m) from
Theorem 20. Thus, by Lemma 22, the patience of the 3-state Purgatory Duel is 2Ω(m).
The restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel. The above corollary only shows that the for the 3-state Purgatory Duel, in
which one state have m2 actions and others have 1, the patience is at least 2Ω(m). We now show how to decrease the
number of actions from quadratic down to linear, while keeping the same patience.
From Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 we see that for any optimal strategy σ1 for player 1 (resp., σ2 for player 2) in
the Purgatory Duel with N = 5, we have that σ1(v11)(1) > 12 and that σ1(v
2
1)(1) >
1
2 (resp., σ2(v11)(m) > 12
and that σ2(v21)(m) > 12 ). Hence, there exists an optimal strategy for player 1 in the 3-state Purgatory Duel that
only plays actions on the form (1, a21) and (a11, 1) with positive probability. More precisely, the strategy τ1 where
(1) τ1(vs)((1, a21)) = σ1(v21)(a21); and (2) τ1(vs)((a11, 1)) = σ1(v11)(a11); and (3) has the remaining probability mass
on (1, 1) is optimal in the 3-state Purgatory Duel, since στ11 is σ1. Similarly for player 2 and the actions (m, a22) and
(a12,m). Let
R1 = {(i, j) | i = 1 ∨ j = 1, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}
and
R2 = {(i, j) | i = m ∨ j = m, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m} .
Observe that |R1| = |R2| = 2m−1. We say that a strategy for player i, for each i, is restricted if the strategy uses only
actions in Ri. The sub-matrix corresponding to the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel for m = 2 is depicted as the grey
sub-matrix in Figure 4. This suggests the definition of the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel, which is like the 3-state
Purgatory Duel, except that the strategies for the players are restricted. We next show that ε-optimal strategies in the
restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel also have high patience (note, that while this is perhaps not surprising, it does not
follow directly from the similar result for the 3-state Purgatory Duel, since it is possible that the restriction removes the
optimal best reply to some strategy which would otherwise not be ε-optimal). The key idea of the proof is as follows:
(i) we show that the patience of player i in the 3-state Purgatory Duel remains unchanged even if only the opponent is
enforced to use restricted strategies; and (ii) each player has a restricted strategy that is optimal in the 3-state Purgatory
Duel as well as in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel.
Lemma 24. The value of state v′s in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel is 12
Proof. Each player has a restricted strategy which is optimal in the 3-state Purgatory Duel and ensures value 12 . Thus,
these strategies must still be optimal in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel and still ensure value 12 .
The next lemma is conceptually similar to Lemma 15 for N = 5 (however, it does not follow from Lemma 15,
since the strategies for player 1 are restricted here).
Lemma 25. Let τ2 be an ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel, for
0 < ε < 12 . Then,
∑m
i=1 τ2(v
′
s)(i, j) > 0, for each j.
Proof. Fix 0 < ε < 12 . Let τ2 be a stationary strategy in the 3-state Purgatory Duel (note, we do not require that τ2 is
restricted), such that there exists an a2 for which
∑
a1
τ2(v
′
s)((a1, a2)) = 0. Let a′ be smallest such a2.
Fix 0 < η < 12 − ε. We show that there exists a restricted stationary strategy τ1 for player 1, ensuring that the
payoff is at least 1− η > 12 + ε. There are two cases. Either (i) a′ = 1 or (ii) not.
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In case (i), let σ1(v′s) be an η-optimal strategy for player 1 in the Purgatory with parameters (3,m). Then consider
the strategy τ1(v′s), where τ1(v′s)((a, 1)) = σ1(v′s)(a), for each a. Observe that τ1 is a restricted strategy. Consider
what happens if τ1 is played against τ2: In each round i, as long as vi = v′s, the next state is either defined by the first
or the second component of the actions of the players. If it is defined by the second component, then the next state
vi+1 is always v′s, because player 1’s first component is 1 and player 2’s first component greater than 1. Consider the
rounds where the next state is defined by the first component. In such rounds⊤ is reached with probability (1− η) · p,
for some p > 0 and ⊥ is reached with probability at most η · p, because player 1 follows an η-optimal strategy in
Purgatory on the first component. But in expectation, in every second round the first component is used and thus ⊤ is
reached with probability at least 1− η, which shows that σ2 is not ε-optimal.
In case (ii), consider the strategy τ1, such that τ1(v′s)((1, a′)) = 1. Observe that τ1 is a restricted strategy. Consider
what happens if τ1 is played against τ2: In each round i, as long as vi = v′s, the next state is either defined by the
first or the second component of the players choice. If it is defined by the first component, then the next state vi+1 is
always v′s or ⊤, because the choice of player 1 is 1. Consider the rounds where the next state is defined by the second
component. In each such round either ⊤ or v′s is reached and ⊤ is reached with positive probability, since player 1
plays a′ > 1 and player 2 always plays something else and 1 with positive probability. But in expectation, in every
second round the second component is used and hence ⊤ is reached with probability 1 eventually, which shows that
σ2 is not ε-optimal.
We will now define how to mirror strategies in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel.
Definition 26. Given a stationary strategy τi for player i in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel, for either i, let ττiî
be the stationary strategy for player î (referred to as the mirror strategy of τi) in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel
where ττi
î
(v′s)((a1, a2)) = τi(v
′
s)((a2, a1)) for each a1 and a2.
We next show that each ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 can be mirrored to an ε-optimal stationary for
player 1. The statement and the proof idea are similar to Lemma 16, but since the strategies for the players are
restricted here, there are some differences.
Lemma 27. For all 0 < ε < 12 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy τ2 for player 2 in the restricted 3-state Purgatory
Duel is such that the mirror strategy ττ21 is ε-optimal for player 1 in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel.
Proof. Fix ε, such that 0 < ε < 12 . Consider some ε-optimal stationary strategy τ∗2 for player 2 in the restricted
3-state Purgatory Duel. Let τ∗1 = τ
τ∗2
1 be the mirror strategy for player 1 given τ∗2 and let τ2 be an optimal best
reply to τ∗1 . Let τ1 = τ
τ2
1 be the mirror strategy for player 1 given τ2. Observe that eventually either ⊤ or ⊥ is
reached with probability 1, when playing τ∗1 against τ2, by Lemma 25 and the construction of the game (since there
is a positive probability that the second component matches in every round in which the play is in v′s). We have
that u(v′s, τ1, τ∗2 ) ≤ 12 + ε, since τ
∗
2 is ε-optimal. This indicates that ⊤′ is reached with probability at most 12 + ε
when playing τ1 against τ∗2 . Hence, by symmetry ⊥′ is reached with probability at most 12 + ε when playing τ
∗
1
against τ2. Thus, since ⊥′ or ⊤′ is reached with probability 1, we have that u(v′s, τ∗1 , τ2) ≥ 12 − ε, showing that τ
∗
1 is
ε-optimal.
We next show that ε-optimal stationary strategies for player 1 requires high (exponential) patience. The state-
ment and the proof idea are similar to Lemma 19, but since the players strategies are restricted here, there are some
differences.
Lemma 28. For all 0 < ε < 13 , each ε-optimal stationary strategy σ1 for player 1 in the restricted 3-state Purgatory
Duel has patience 2Ω(m).
Proof. Fix some 0 < ε < 13 and some ε-optimal stationary strategy σ1 for player 1 in the restricted 3-state Purgatory
Duel. The restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel then turns into an MDP M for player 2 and we can apply Lemma 18(2).
We have that p =
∑
a11
σ1(v
′
s)(a
1
1, a
2
2)/2 is the probability that player 1 plays an action with second component a22
and the next state is defined by the second component. Let d(a21, a22) be the probability distribution over successors
if player 2 plays (a21, a22) in v′s. Observe that the play would go to ⊥ if both players played a22 and the next state is
defined by the second component and thus
d(a21, a
2
2)(⊥)− p ≥ 0 .
Let
d′(a21, a
2
2)(v) =

d(a21, a
2
2)(v
′
s) + p if v = v′s
d(a21, a
2
2)(⊥)− p if v = ⊥
d(a21, a
2
2)(⊤) if v = ⊤ .
Consider the MDP M ′, which is equal to M , except that it uses the distribution d′(a21, a22) instead of d(a21, a22). By
Lemma 18(2) we have that
val(M ′) ≥ val(M) ≥ 1
2
− ε ≥
1
6
.
It is clear that player 2 has an optimal positional strategy in M ′ that plays (a21,m) for some a21 (this strategy is
restricted), since playing (a21, a22), for some a22 < m, just increases the probability to reach ⊤ in one step (because
player 1 might play some action a12 > a22 and otherwise the play will go back to v′s). But M ′ corresponds to the
MDP obtained by playing σ1 in the Purgatory with N = 3 (where v′s corresponds to v1), except that with probability
1
2 the play goes from v
′
s back to v′s in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel no matter the choice of the players. This
difference clearly does not change the value. Hence, σ1 ensures payoff at least 16 in the Purgatory with N = 3 and
hence has patience 2Ω(m) by [20].
We are now ready for the main result of this section.
Theorem 29. For all 0 < ε < 13 , every ε-optimal stationary strategy, for either player, in the restricted 3-state
Purgatory Duel (that has three states, two of which are absorbing, and the non-absorbing state has O(m) actions for
each player) has patience 2Ω(m).
Proof. By Lemma 28, the statement is true for every ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 1. By Lemma 27, every
ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 corresponds to an ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 1, with the same
patience, and thus every ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 has patience 2Ω(m).
5 Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Patience Upper Bound
In this section we give upper bounds on the patience of optimal and ε-optimal stationary strategies in a zero-sum
concurrent reachability gameG for the safety player. Our exposition here makes heavy use of the setup of Hansen et al.
[21] and will for that reason not be fully self-contained. We assume for concreteness that the player 1 is the reachability
player and player 2 the safety player.
Hansen et al. showed [21, Corollary 42] for the more general class of Everett’s recursive games [16] that each
player has an ε-optimal stationary strategy of doubly-exponential patience. More precisely, if all probabilities have
bit-size at most τ , then each player has an ε-optimal strategy of patience bounded by (1ε )
τmO(N)
. For zero-sum
concurrent reachability games the safety player is guaranteed to have an optimal stationary strategy [30, 23]. Using
this fact one may use directly the results of Hansen et al. to show that the safety player has an optimal strategy of
patience bounded by (1ε )
τmO(N
2)
. We shall below refine this latter upper bound in terms of the number of value
classes of the game. The overall approach in deriving this is the same, namely we use the general machinery of real
algebraic geometry and semi-algebraic geometry [3] to derive our bounds. In order to do this we derive a formula in
the first order theory of the real numbers that uniquely defines the value of the game, and from the value of the game
we can express the optimal strategies. The improved bound is obtained by presenting a formula where the number of
variables depend only on the number of value classes rather than the number of states.
Let below N denote the number of non-absorbing states, and m ≥ 2 the maximum number of actions in a state for
either player. Assume that all probabilities are rational numbers with numerators and denominators of bit-size at most
τ , where the bit-size of a positive integer n is given by ⌊lg n⌋+ 1. We let K denote the number of value classes. We
number the non-absorbing states 1, . . . , N and assume that both players have the actions {1, . . . ,m} in each of these
states. For a non-negative integer z, define bit(z) = ⌈lg z⌉.
Given valuations v1, . . . , vN for the non-absorbing states, we define for each state k a m×m matrix game Ak(v)
letting entry (i, j) be skij +
∑N
ℓ=1 p
kℓ
ij vℓ, where pkℓij = δ(k, i, j)(ℓ) and skij is the probability of a transition to a state
where the reachability player wins, given actions i and j in state k. The value mapping operator M : RN → RN
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is given by M(v) =
(
val(A1(v), . . . , val(AN (v)))
)
. Everett showed that the value vector of his recursive games are
given by the unique critical vector, which in turn is defined using the value mapping. We will instead for concur-
rent reachability games use the characterization of the value vector as the coordinate-wise least fixpoint of the value
mapping. The value vector v is thus characterized by the formula
M(v) = v ∧ (∀v′ : M(v′) = v′ ⇒ v ≤ v′) . (1)
Similarly to [21, proof of Theorem 13] we obtain the following statement.
Lemma 30. There is a quantifier free formula with N variables v that expresses M(v) = v. The formula uses at
most N(m + 2)4m different polynomials, each of degree at most m + 2 and having coefficients of bit-size at most
2(N + 1)(m+ 2)2 bit(m)τ .
Now, if we instead introduce a variable for each value class, we can expressM(v) = v using onlyK free variables,
by identifying variables of the same value class. For w ∈ RK , let v(w) ∈ RN denote the vector obtained by letting
the coordinates corresponding to value class j be assigned wj . We thus simply express M(v(w)) = v(w) instead.
Combining this with (1) we obtain the final formula.
Corollary 31. There is a quantified formula with K free variables that describes whether the vector v(w) is the value
vector of G. The formula has a single block of quantifiers over K variables. Furthermore the formula uses at most
2N(m + 2)4m + K different polynomials, each of degree at most m + 2 and having coefficients of bit-size at most
2(N + 1)(m+ 2)2 bit(m)τ .
We shall now apply the quantifier elimination [3, Theorem 14.16] and sampling [3, Theorem 13.11] procedures to
the formula of Corollary 31.
First we use Theorem 14.16 of Basu, Pollack, and Roy [3] obtaining a quantifier free formula with K variables, ex-
pressing that w(v) is the value of G. Next we use Theorem 13.11 of [3] to obtain a univariate representation of w such
that v(w) is the value vector of G. That is, we obtain univariate real polynomials f, g0, . . . , gK , where f and g0 are co-
prime, such that w = (g1(t)/g0(t), . . . , gK(t)/g0(t)), where t is a root of f . These polynomial are of degree mO(K
2)
and their coefficients have bit-size τmO(K2). Our next task is to recover from w an optimal strategy for the safety
player. For this we just need to select optimal strategies for the column player in each of the matrix games Ak(v(w)).
Such optimal strategies correspond to basic feasible solutions of standard linear programs for computing the value and
optimal strategies of matrix games (cf. [21, Lemma 3]). This means that there exists (m + 1) × (m + 1) matrices
M1(w), . . . ,MN(w), such that (qk1 (w), . . . , qkm(w)) is an optimal strategy for the column player in Ak(v(w)) where
qki (w) = det((M
k(w))i)/ det(M
k(w)), where (Mk(w))i denotes the matrix obtained fromMk(w) by replacing col-
umn i with the (m+1)th unit vector em+1. As the matrices M1(w), . . . ,Mk(w) are obtained from the matrix games
A1(v(w)), . . . , AN (v(w)), the entries are degree 1 polynomial in w and having rational coefficients with numerators
and denominators of bit-size at most τ as well. Using a simple bound on determinants [3, Proposition 8.12], and
substituting the expression gj(t)/g0(t) forwj for each j, we obtain a univariate representation of (qk1 (w), . . . , qkm(w))
for each k given by polynomials of degree mO(K2) and their coefficients have bit-size τmO(K2). Substituting the root
t using resultants (cf. [21, Lemma 15]) we finally obtain the following result.
Theorem 32. Let G be a zero-sum concurrent reachability game with N non-absorbing states, at most m ≥ 2 actions
for each player in every non-absorbing state, and where all probabilities are rational numbers with numerators and
denominators of bit-size at most τ . Assume further that G has at most K value classes. Then there is an optimal
strategy for the safety player where each probability is a real algebraic number, defined by a polynomial of degree
mO(K
2) and maximum coefficient bit-size τmO(K2).
By a standard root separation bounds (e.g. [38, Chapter 6, equation (5)]) we obtain a patience upper bound.
Corollary 33. Let G be as in Theorem 32. Then there is an optimal strategy for the safety player of patience at most
2τm
O(K2)
.
In general the probabilities of this optimal strategy will be irrational numbers. However we may employ the
rounding scheme as explained in Lemma 14 and Theorem 15 of Hansen, Koucky´, and Miltersen [22] to obtain a
rational ε-optimal strategy. Letting ε = 2−ℓ we may round each probability, except the largest, upwards to L =
lg 1ε + lg lg
1
ε +Nτm
O(K2) binary digits, and then rounding the largest probability down by the total amount the rest
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were rounded up. Here we use that by fixing the above strategy of patience at most 2τmO(K
2) for the safety player and
an pure strategy for the reachability player one obtains a Markov chain where each non-zero transition probability is
at least (2τmO(K
2)
)−1. We thus have the following.
Corollary 34. Let G be as in Theorem 32. Then there is an ε-optimal strategy for the safety player where each
probability is a rational number with a common denominator of magnitude at most 1ε lg 1ε2Nτm
O(K2)
.
We now address the basic decision problem. Let s be a state and let λ be a rational number with numerator and
denominator of bit-size at most κ, and consider the task of deciding whether v2(s) ≥ λ. An equivalent task is to
decide whether v2(s)− λ ≥ 0. Since v2(s) is a real algebraic number defined by a polynomial of degree mO(K
2) and
maximum coefficient bit-size τmO(K2) it follows that v2(s) − λ is a real algebraic number defined by a polynomial
of degree mO(K2) and maximum coefficient bit-size (κ + τ)mO(K2). This can be seen by subtracting λ from the
univariate representation of v2(s) and substituting for the root t using a resultant. By standard root separation bounds
this means that either is v2(s) − λ = 0 or |v2(s) − λ| > η, for some η of the form d = 2−(κ+τ)m
O(K2)
. Given an
η/2-optimal strategy σ2 for the safety player, by fixing the strategy σ2 we obtain an MDP for player 1, where we
can find the value v˜2(s) of state s using linear programming, and the computed estimate v˜2(s) for v2(s) is within
η/2 of the true value. Thus if v˜2(s) ≥ λ − η/2 we conclude that v2(s) ≥ λ (and similarly if v˜2(s) ≥ λ + η/2 we
conclude that v2(s) > λ). Now, if we fix K to be a constant and consider the promise problem that G has at most K
value classes, then a rational η/2-optimal strategy σ2 exists with numerators and denominators of polynomial bit-size
by Corollary 34. Now, by simply guessing non-deterministically the strategy σ2 and verifying as above we have the
following result.
Theorem 35. For a fixed constantK , the promise problem of deciding whether v1(s) ≥ λ given a zero-sum concurrent
stochastic game with at most K value classes is in coNP if player 1 has reachability objective and in NP if player 1
has safety objective.
Note that interestingly it does not follow similarly that the promise problem is in (coNP∩NP), because the games
are not symmetric.
Remark 36 (Complexity of approximation for constant value classes). As a direct consequence we have that for a
game G promised to have at most K value classes, the value of a state can be approximated in FPNP. This improves
on the FNPNP bound of Frederiksen and Miltersen [18] (that holds in general with no restriction on the number of
value classes).
6 Non-Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Bounds on Patience and
Roundedness
In this section we consider non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games where each player has either a reachability or a
safety objective. We first present a remark on the lower bound in the presence of even a single player with reachability
objective, and then for the rest of the section focus on non-zero-sum games where all players have safety objectives.
Remark 37. In non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, with at least two players, even if there is one player with
reachability objectives, then at least doubly-exponential patience is required for ε-Nash equilibrium strategies. We
have the property if k = 2 and one player is a reachability player and the other is a safety player, from Section 3.3.
It is also easy to see that Lemma 9 together with Lemma 15 imply that if player 1 is identified with the objective
(Reach, {⊤}) and player 2 is identified with the objective (Reach, {⊥}) and they are playing the Purgatory Duel, then
each strategy profile σ, that forms a ε-Nash equilibrium, for any 0 < ε < 13 , in the Purgatory Duel, has patience
2m
Ω(n)
. This is because player 2 has a harder objective (a subset of the plays satisfies it) than in Section 3.3, but can
still ensure the same payoff (by using an optimal strategy for player 2 in the concurrent reachability variant, which
ensures that ⊥ is reached with probability at least 12 ). In this case, we say that a strategy is optimal (resp., ε-optimal)for a player, if it is optimal (resp., ε-optimal) for the corresponding player in the concurrent reachability version.
It is clear that only if both strategies are optimal (resp., ε-optimal), then the strategies forms a Nash equilibrium
(resp., ε-Nash equilibrium). Thus the doubly-exponential lower bound follows even for non-zero-sum games with two
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reachability players. The key idea to extend to more players, of which at least one is a reachability player, is as follows:
Consider some reachability player i. The game for which the lower bound holds can be described as follows. First
player i picks another player j and they then proceed to play the Purgatory Duel with parameters n,m against each
other. This can be captured by a game with k(2n + 1) + 3 states, where each matrix has size at most max(m, k).
Each player must then use doubly-expoential patience in every strategy profile that forms an ε-Nash equilibrium, for
sufficently small ε > 0. First consider a player j that is different from i, and a strategy for player j with low patience.
It follows that player i would then simply play against player j and win with good probability. Second, consider a
strategy for player i with low patience and there are two cases. Either player i gets a payoff close to 12 or not. If
he gets a payoff close to 12 , then the player he is most likely to play against can deviate to an optimal strategy and
increase his payoff by an amount close to 12k , which player i loses. On the other hand, if player i gets a payoff far
from 12 , then he can deviate to an optimal strategy and then he gets payoff 12 .
The rest of the section is devoted to non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with safety objectives for all
players, and first we establish an exponential upper bound on patience and then an exponential lower bound for ε-
Nash equilibrium strategies, for ε > 0.
6.1 Exponential upper bound on roundedness
In this section we consider non-zero-sum concurrent safety games, with k ≥ 2 players, and such games are also called
stay-in-a-set games, by [33]. We will argue that, for all 0 < ε < 14 , in any such game, there exists a strategy profile σ
that forms an ε-Nash equilibrium and have roundedness at most
−32 · k2 · ln(ε) · n · (δmin)
−n ·m
ε
.
Note that the roundedness is only exponential, as compared to the doubly-exponential patience when there is at least
one reachability player (Remark 37). Note that the bound is polynomial in m and k; and also polynomial in n if
δmin = 1.
Players already lost, and all winners. For a prefix of a play P ℓ′s , for a starting state s, play Ps and length ℓ′, let
L̂(P ℓ
′
s ) be the set of players that have not lost already in P ℓ
′
s (note that for each i, player i has lost in a play prefix if a
state not in Si has been visited in the prefix). Let P ℓ′s be some prefix of a play and we define W (P ℓ
′
s ) as the event that
each player in L̂(P ℓ′s ) wins with probability 1.
Player-stationary strategies. As shown by [33], there exists a strategy profile σ = (σi)i that forms a Nash equi-
librium. They show that the strategy σi, for any player i, in the witness Nash equilibrium strategy profile has the
following properties: For each set of players Π and state s, there exists a probability distribution σ̂i(Π, s), such that
for each prefix of a play P ℓ′s , play Ps and length ℓ′, if P ℓ
′
s ends in s′, we have that σi(P ℓ
′
s ) = σ̂i(L̂(P
ℓ′
s ), s
′) (i.e., the
strategy only depends on the players who have not lost yet and the current state). Also, there exists some positional
strategy σ′i, such that σ̂i(Π, s) = σ′i(s), for all i 6∈ Π (i.e., players who have lost already play some fixed positional
strategy). This allows them to only consider the sub-gameGΠ, which is the game in which each player i not in Π plays
σ′i. Also, if there is a strategy profile which ensures that each player in Π wins with probability 1 if the play starts in s
of GΠ, then the probability distribution σ̂i(Π, s) is pure5 and it ensures that the players in Π wins with probability 1.
We call strategies with these properties player-stationary strategies.
The real number ε and the length ℓ. In the remainder of this section, fix 0 < ε < 14 and fix the length ℓ, such that
ℓ = −n · k · ln(ε/(4k)) · (δmin)
−n .
We will, in Lemma 39, argue that any player-stationary strategy is such that with probability 1−ε no player loses after
ℓ steps. Also several lemmas in this section will use ℓ and ε.
5it is not explicitly mentioned in [33] that the distributions are pure, but it follows from the fact that if all players can ensure their objectives with
probability 1, then there exists a positional strategy profile ensuring so, by just considering an MDP (with all players together) with a conjunction
of safety objectives
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The event E(P ℓ′s ). Given a play Ps, starting in state s for some s and any ℓ′, let E(P ℓ
′
s ) be the event that either the
event (L̂(P ℓ
′
s ) ( L̂(P
ℓ′−1
s )) (i.e., some player lost at the ℓ′-th step) or the event W (P ℓ
′
s ) (i.e., the remaining players
win with probability 1) happens. In [33, 2.1 Lemma] they show6:
Lemma 38. Fix a player-stationary strategy profile σ. Let T ≥ 0 denote a round (or a step of plays). Let Y T,s be the
set of plays, where for all plays Ps in Y T,s, either the remaining players win with probability 1 in round T (i.e., the
event W (PTs ) happens) or some player loses in round T (i.e., the event L̂(PTs ) ( L̂(PT−1s ) happens). For a constant
c and length ℓ′, let yc,ℓ′ = Prσ[∃T : ℓ′ < T ≤ ℓ′ + cn ∧ Ps ∈ Y T,s] denote the probability that event Y T,s happens
for some T between ℓ′ and ℓ′ + cn. Then, for all constants c and length ℓ′, we have that
yc,ℓ′ ≥ 1− (1− (δmin)
n)c .
Note that T above depends on the play Ps. It is straightforward that players can lose at most k times in any play
Ps, simply because there are at most k players, and if the remaining players win with probability 1 in round T , then
they also win with probability 1 in round T + 1, by construction of σ.
Proof overview. Our proof will proceed as follows. Consider the game, while the players play some player-stationary
strategy profile that forms a Nash equilibria. First, we show that it is unlikely (low-probability event) that the players do
not play positional (like they do if the event W (P ℓ′s ) has happened) after some exponential number of steps. Second,
we show that if we change each of the probabilities used by an exponentially small amount as compared to the Nash
equilibria, then it is unlikely that that there will be a large difference in the first exponentially many steps. This allows
us to round the probabilities to exponentially small probabilities while the players only lose little.
Lemma 39. Fix some player-stationary strategy profile σ. Consider the set P of plays Ps, under σ, such that W (P ℓs )
does not happen. Then, the probability Prσ[P ] is less than ε/4.
Proof. Fix 0 < ε < 12 and a player-stationary strategy profile σ. Let c = − ln(ε/(4k)) · (δmin)−n > 1. We will argue
that the event E(P ℓ′s ) happens at least k times with probability at least 1− ε/4 over c · n · k = ℓ steps.
We consider two cases, either δmin = 1 or 0 < δmin < 1. If δmin = 1, the event ∃1 ≤ T ≤ n : E(P ℓ
′+T
s )
always happens (otherwise, in case it did not in some play, then a deterministic cycle satisfying the safety objectives
of all players who have not lost yet is executed, and then the players could win by playing whatever they did the last
time they were in a given state). If 0 < δmin < 1, we see that c ≥ c′ = ln(ε/(4k))ln(1−(δmin)−n) , since 1 + x ≤ ex and that
∃1 ≤ T ≤ c′ · n : E(P ℓ
′+T
s ) happens with probability at least 1− ε/(4k) by Lemma 38. In either case, we have that
the event ∃1 ≤ T ≤ c · n : E(P ℓ′+Ts ) happens with probability at least 1− ε/(4k).
Next, split the plays up in epochs of length c · n each, and we get that the event E(PTs ) happens at least once for
T ranging over the steps of an epoch with probability at least 1 − ε/(4k) and hence happens at least once in each of
the first k epochs with probability at least 1 − ε/4 using union bound. At that point the remaining players win with
probability 1. The first k epochs have length c · k · n = ℓ and the lemma follows.
We use the above lemma to show that any strategy profile close to a Nash equilibrium ensures payoffs close to that
equilibrium. To do so, we use coupling (similar to [11]).
Variation distance. The variation distance is a measure of the similarity between two distributions. Given a finite set
Z , and two distributions d1 and d2 over Z , the variation distance of the distributions is
var(d1, d2) =
1
2
·
∑
z∈Z
|d1(z)− d2(z)| .
We will extend the notion of variation distances to strategies as follows: Given two strategies σi and σ′i for player i the
variation distance between the strategies is
var(σi, σ
′
i) = sup
P ℓs
var(σi(P
ℓ
s ), σ
′
i(P
ℓ
s )) ;
i.e., it is the supremum over the variation distance of the distributions used by the strategies for finite-prefixes of plays.
6they do not explicitly show that the constant is 1− (δmin)n, but it follows easily from an inspection of the proof
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Coupling and coupling lemma. Given a pair of distributions, a coupling is a probability distribution over the joint
set of possible outcomes. Let Z be a finite set. For distributions d1 and d2 over the finite set Z , a coupling ω is a
distribution over Z × Z , such that for all z ∈ Z we have
∑
z′∈Z ω(z, z
′) = d1(z) and also for all z′ ∈ Z we have∑
z∈Z ω(z, z
′) = d2(z
′). One of the most important properties of coupling is the coupling lemma [1] of which we
only mention and use the second part:
• (Coupling lemma). For a pair of distributions d1 and d2, there exists a coupling ω of d1 and d2, such that for a
random variable (X,Y ) from the distribution ω, we have that var(d1, d2) = Pr[X 6= Y ].
Smaller support. Fix a pair of strategies σi and σ′i for player i for some i. We say that σ′i has smaller support than
σi, if for all P ℓs we have that
Supp(σ′i(P
ℓ
s )) ⊆ Supp(σi(P
ℓ
s )) .
Lemma 40. Let σ = (σi)i and σ′ = (σ′i)i be player-stationary strategy profiles, such that
var(σ, σ′) ≤
ε
ℓ · k · 4
,
and such that σ′i has smaller support than σi, for all i. Then σ′ is such that
u(G, s, σ′, i) ∈ [u(G, s, σ, i)− ε/2, u(G, s, σ, i) + ε/2]
for each player i and state s.
Proof. Fix σ and σ′ according to the lemma statement. For any prefix of a play P ℓ′s , for any state s and length ℓ′ and
player i, we have that var(σi(P ℓ
′
s ), σ
′
i(P
ℓ′
s )) ≤
ε
ℓ·k·4 and thus, we can create a coupling ω = (X
P ℓ
′
s
i , Y
P ℓ
′
s
i ) between
the two distributions σi(P ℓ
′
s ) and σ′i(P ℓ
′
s ), i.e., X
P ℓ
′
s
i ∼ σi(P
ℓ′
s ) and Y
P ℓ
′
s
i ∼ σ
′
i(P
ℓ′
s ) is such that Pr[X
P ℓ
′
s
i 6= Y
P ℓ
′
s
i ] ≤
ε
ℓ·k·4 . Then, consider some state s and consider a play Ps, picked using the random variables X
P ℓ
′
s
i , and a play Qs,
picked using the random variables Y P
ℓ′
s
i (where, if the players uses the same action in P ℓ
′
s and Qℓ
′
s , then the next state
is also the same, using an implicit coupling). Then according to Lemma 39, the probability that W (P ℓs ) occurs is at
least 1 − ε/4. In that case, we are interested in the probability that Qs = Ps. Observe that we just need to ensure
that P ℓs and Qℓs are the same, since at that point the players play according to the same positional strategy, because
of the smaller support. For each ℓ′′ ≤ ℓ, if the first ℓ′′ steps match, then the next step match with probability at least
1 − εℓ·k·4 · k, since each of the k players has a probability of
ε
ℓ·k·2 to differ in the two plays. Hence, all ℓ steps match
with probability at least 1− εℓ·k·4 · ℓ · k = 1− ε/4. Hence, with probability at least 1− ε/2 we have that Ps equals Qs
and thus, especially, the payoff for each player must be the same in that case. But observe that Ps is distributed like
plays under σ and Qs is distributed like plays under σ′ and the statement follows.
We will next show that we only need to consider deviations to player-stationary strategies for the purpose of
player-stationary equilibria.
Lemma 41. For all player-stationary strategy profiles σ and each player i, there exists a pure player-stationary
strategy σ′i for player i maximizing u(G, s, σ[σ′i], i).
Proof. Observe first that it does not matter what player i does if he has already lost, and we can consider him to play
some fixed positional strategy in that case. Also, when the remaining players play according to σ, we can view the
game as being an MDP, in the games GΠ. The objective of player i is then to reach a sub-game of GΠ and a state
in that sub-game, from which he cannot lose. But it is well-known that such reachability objectives have positional
optimal strategies in MDPs. Hence, this strategy forms a pure player-stationary strategy in the original game.
We will use Lemma 3 from [11]. The proof only appears in [10], where the lemma is Lemma 4.
Lemma 42. (Lemma 3, [11]). Let Z be a set of size ℓ. Let d1 be some distribution over Z and let q ≥ ℓ be some
integer. Then there exists some distribution d2, such that for each z ∈ Z , there exists an integer p such that d2(z) = pq
and such that |d1(z)− d2(z)| < 1q .
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We are now ready to show the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 43. For all concurrent stochastic games with all k safety players, for all 0 < ε < 14 , there exists a player-
stationary strategy profile σ that forms an ε-Nash equilibrium and has roundedness at most
4n · k2 ·m · ε−1 · ln(4k/ε) · (δmin)
−n .
Proof. Fix some player-stationary strategy profile σ that forms a Nash-equilibrium and some 0 < ε < 14 and let
ℓ := −n · k · ln(ε/(4k)) · (δmin)
−n .
Consider some distribution d1 over some set Z . Observe that for each distribution d2 with smaller support than
d1 and such that |d1(z) − d2(z)| < 1q , for each z ∈ Supp(d1), we have var(d1, d2) ≤
|Supp(d1)|
q . Then, applying
Lemma 42, for q = ℓ·k·4·mε and Z = Supp(d), to each probability distribution d defining σ, we see that there exists a
player-stationary strategy profile σ′ = (σ′i)i, such that (1)
var(σ, σ′) ≤
m
q
=
ε
ℓ · k · 4
;
and (2) σ′i has smaller support than σi; and (3) σ′i(P ℓs ) is a fraction with denominator q. Observe that the strategy has
roundedness q.
We now argue that σ′ is an ε-Nash equilibrium. Consider some player i and a player-stationary strategy σ′′i
maximizing the probability that player i wins when the remaining players play according to σ′, which is known to
exists by Lemma 41. From Lemma 40, we have that
u(G, s, σ[σ′′i ], i) ≥ u(G, s, σ
′[σ′′i ], i)− ε/2
and
u(G, s, σ, i) ≤ u(G, s, σ′, i) + ε/2 .
Thus, u(G, s, σ′, i) ≥ u(G, s, σ′[σ′′i ], i)− ε. This completes the proof.
Remark 44 (Finding an ε-Nash equilibria in TFNP). We explain how the results of this section imply that for non-zero-
sum concurrent stochastic games with safety objectives for all players, if the number k of players is only a constant or
logarithmic, then we can compute an ε-Nash equilibria in TFNP, where ε > 0 is given in binary as part of the input.
Note that there is a polynomial-size witness (to guess) for a stationary strategy with exponential roundedness. Observe
that a player-stationary strategy for a player is defined by 2k−1 + 1 stationary strategies, one used in case that the
respective player has lost, and one for each subset of other players. Thus, we can guess polynomial-size witnesses of
k player-stationary strategies with exponential roundedness, given that the number of players is at most logarithmic
in the size of the input. Hence, according to Theorem 43, we can guess a candidate strategy profile σ that forms an
ε-Nash equilibrium in non-deterministic polynomial time. For each player i, constructing the (polynomial-sized) MDP
described in the proof of Lemma 41 and then solving it using linear programming gives us the payoff of playing the
strategy maximizing the value for player i while the remaining players follows σ. If, for each player i, the payoff only
differs at most ε from what achieved by player i when all players follows σ, then the strategy profile σ is an ε-Nash
equilibrium. It follows that the approximation of some ε-Nash equilibria can be achieved in TFNP, given that the
number of players is at most logarithmic.
6.2 Exponential lower bound on patience
In this section, we show that Ω((δmin)−(n−3)/6) patience is required, for each strategy profile that forms an ε-Nash
equilibrium, for any 0 < ε < 16 , in a family of games {G
(δmin)
c | c ∈ N ∧ δmin < 6
−3} with two safety players.
Game family Gδminc . For a fixed number c ≥ 1 and 0 < δmin < 6−3, the game Gδminc is defined as follows: There
are n = 4 · c+ 3 states, namely, S = {vs, v1, v2,⊤,⊥} ∪ {vℓj | j ∈ {1, 2} ∧ ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , 2 · c− 1}}. For player i in
state vj , for j = 1, 2, there are two actions, called aj,1i and a
j,2
i , respectively. For each other state s and each player i,
there is a single action, a. For simplicity, for each pair of states s, s′ we write d(s, s′) for the probability distribution,
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Figure 5: An illustration of the game Gδmin2 . The probabilities are as follows: The probability of each dashed edge
is 1 − δmin; and the probability of each dotted edge is δmin; and the probability of each solid edge is 1. The only
exception is the edges from vs, where the probability is written on each edge (it is 12 in each case).
where d(s, s′)(s) = 1 − δmin and d(s, s′)(s′) = δmin. Also, we define v01 as ⊤ and v02 as ⊥. The states ⊥ and ⊤ are
absorbing. The state vs is such that7 δ(vs, a, a) = U(v1, v2). For each j ∈ {1, 2}, the transition function of state vj is
δ(vj , a
j,ℓ
1 , a
j,ℓ′
2 ) =

d(vs, v
c−1
j ) if ℓ = ℓ′
d(vs, v
2c−1
ĵ
) if ℓ < ℓ′
v0
ĵ
if ℓ > ℓ′
For each other state vℓj , the transition function is δ(vℓj , a, a) = d(vs, v
ℓ−1
j ). The objective of player 1 is (Safety, S \
{⊥}) and the objective of player 2 is (Safety, S \ {⊤}). See Figure 5 for an illustration of Gδmin2 .
Near-zero-sum property. Observe that either ⊥ or ⊤ is reached with probability 1 (and once ⊤ or ⊥ is reached, the
game stays there). The reasoning is as follows: there is a probability of at least (δmin)2c to reach either ⊤ or ⊥ within
the next 2c+ 1 steps from any state. If the current state is vs, then the next state is either v1 or v2, and from v1 or v2
through vℓj for each ℓ from 1 to 2c−1, for some j, either⊤ or⊥ is reached, and each of the steps from v1 or v2 onward
happens with probability at least δmin, no matter the choice of the players. Hence, the game is in essence zero-sum,
since with probability 1 precisely one player wins.
Proof overview. Our proof has two parts. We show that there is a strategy for player i, for each i, that ensures that
against all strategies for the other player, the payoff is at least 12 for player i. Also, we show that for each strategy of
player i with patience at most (δmin)−2/3·c, there is a strategy for the other player such that the payoff is less than 16
for player i. This then allows us to show that no strategy profile that forms a 16 -Nash equilibrium has patience less
than (δmin)−2/3·c.
Lemma 45. For each i, player i has a strategy σi such that
inf
σî
u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, i) =
1
2
.
7recall that U(s, s′) is the uniform distribution over s and s′
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Proof. Consider the stationary strategy σ1, where
σ1(v1)(a
1,1
1 ) = σ1(v2)(a
2,1
1 ) =
1 + (δmin)
−c
2 + (δmin)−c + (δmin)c
and
σ1(v1)(a
1,2
1 ) = σ1(v2)(a
2,2
1 ) =
1 + (δmin)
c
2 + (δmin)−c + (δmin)c
.
Observe that fixing σ1 as the strategy for player 1, the game turns into an MDP for player 2. Such games have a
positional strategy ensuring that the payoff for player 2 is as large as possible. Going through all four candidates for
σ2, one can see that maxσ2 u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 2) = 12 . Because of the near-zero-sum property, this minimizes the payoff
for player 1 (since u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 1) + u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 2) = 1), which is then infσ2 u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 1) = 12 . The
strategy for player 2 follows from σ1 and the symmetry of the game.
We next argue that if player i uses a low-patience strategy, then the opponent can ensure low payoff for player i.
Lemma 46. Let σi be a strategy for player i with patience at most (δmin)−2/3·c. Then there exists a pure strategy σ̂i
such that u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, î) > 1− 16 .
Proof. Consider first player 1 (the argument for player 2 follows from symmetry). Let σ1 be some strategy with
patience at most (δmin)−(n−3)/6 = (δmin)−2/3·c.
The pure strategy σ2 is defined given σ1 as follows. For plays P ℓs ending in state v1 or v2 we have that
σ2(P
ℓ
s ) =
{
aj,j2 if σ1(P ℓs )(a
j,2
2 ) > 0
aj,ĵ2 if σ1(P ℓs ) = a
j,1
2 .
To argue that u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 2) > 1− 16 , we consider a play Pvs picked according to (σ1, σ2), such that either⊥ or⊤
is eventually reached. This is true with probability 1. Consider the last round ℓ, such that vℓ = vj , for some j = 1, 2.
We now consider four cases: Either we have that
1. j = 1 and σ1(P ℓs )(a
j,2
2 ) > 0 or
2. j = 1 and σ1(P ℓs ) = a
j,1
2 or
3. j = 2 and σ1(P ℓs )(a
j,2
2 ) > 0 or
4. j = 2 and σ1(P ℓs ) = a
j,1
2 .
The probability to eventually reach ⊥ is then at least the minimum probability to eventually reach ⊥ in each of
the four cases. In case (2) and case (4), we see that player 2 wins with probability 1. In case (1) observe that
from a round ℓ′ where σ1(P ℓ
′
s )(a
1,2
2 ) > 0 player 1 wins (i.e., reaches ⊤ before entering vs again) with probability
(1 − (δmin)
2/3·c) · (δmin)
c < (δmin)
c and player 2 wins (i.e., reaches ⊥ before entering vs again) with probability
(δmin)
2/3·c
. Hence, the probability that player 1 wins if such a round is round ℓ is at most
(δmin)
c
(δmin)2/3·c + (δmin)c
<
(δmin)
c
(δmin)2/3·c
= (δmin)
c/3 <
1
6
,
where the last inequality comes from that c ≥ 1 and δmin < 6−3. In case (3) observe that from a round ℓ′ where
σ1(P
ℓ′
s )(a
2,2
2 ) > 0 player 1 wins (i.e., reaches ⊤ before entering vs again) with probability at most (1− (δmin)2/3·c) ·
(δmin)
2c < (δmin)
2c and player 2 wins (i.e., reaches ⊥ before entering vs again) with probability at least (δmin)2/3·c ·
(δmin)
c = (δmin)
5/3·c
. Hence, the probability that player 1 wins if such a round is round ℓ is at most
(δmin)
2·c
(δmin)5/3·c + (δmin)2·c
<
(δmin)
2·c
(δmin)5/3·c
= (δmin)
c/3 <
1
6
,
where the last inequality comes from that c ≥ 1 and δmin < 6−3. The desired result follows.
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We now prove the main result that no strategy with patience only (δmin)−2/3·c can be a part of a 16 -Nash equilib-
rium.
Theorem 47. For all c ∈ N and all 0 < δmin < 6−3, consider the game Gδminc (that has n = 4c + 3 states and at
most two actions for each player at all states). Each strategy profile σ = (σi)i that forms an 16 -Nash equilibrium has
patience at least (δmin)−(n−3)/6.
Proof. Fix some c ∈ N and 0 < δmin < 6−3. The proof will be by contradiction. Consider first player 1 (the argument
for player 2 follows from symmetry). Let σ1 be some strategy with patience at most (δmin)−(n−3)/6 = (δmin)−2/3·c.
Consider some strategy σ2 for player 2. We consider two cases, either
u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 2) ≤
1
2
+
1
6
=
2
3
or not. If
u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 2) ≤
2
3
,
then player 2 can play a strategy σ′2, shown to exist in Lemma 46, instead and get payoff strictly above 1 − 16 =
5
6 ,
showing that (σ1, σ2) is not an 16 -Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if
u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 2) >
2
3
,
then u(G, vs, σ1, σ2, 1) < 13 and player 1 can play a strategy σ
′
1, shown to exist in Lemma 45, for which
u(G, vs, σ
′
1, σ2, 1) ≥
1
2 . Hence, (σ1, σ2) does not form an
1
6 -Nash equilibrium in this case either. The desired re-
sult follows.
Remark 48. Using ideas similar to Remark 37 we can construct a game with k ≥ 3 safety players in which the
patience is at least (δmin)−(n−3)/(6k) for all strategy profiles that forms an 16k -Nash equilibrium.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we discuss some important features and interesting technical aspects of our results. Finally we conclude
with some remarks.
7.1 Important features of results
We now highlight two important features of our results, namely, the surprising aspects and the significance of the
results.
Surprising aspects of our results. We discuss three surprising aspects of our result.
1. The doubly-exponential lower bound on patience. For concurrent safety games, the properties of strategies re-
semble that of concurrent discounted games. In both cases, (1) optimal strategies exist, (2) there exist stationary
strategies that are optimal, and (3) locally optimal strategies (that play optimally in every state with respect
to the matrix games with values) are optimal. The other class of concurrent games where optimal stationary
strategies exist are concurrent ergodic mean-payoff games, however, in contrast to safety and discounted games,
in concurrent ergodic mean-payoff games not all locally optimal strategies are optimal. However, though for
concurrent discounted games as well for concurrent ergodic mean-payoff games, the optimal bound on the pa-
tience of ǫ-optimal stationary strategies, for ǫ > 0, is exponential, we show a doubly-exponential lower bound
on patience of ǫ-optimal strategies for concurrent safety games, for ǫ > 0.
2. The lower bound example. The second surprising aspect of our result is the lower bound example itself, which
had been elusive for safety games. The closer the lower bound example is to known examples, the greater is
its value, as it is easier to understand, and illustrates the simplicity of our elusive example. Our example is
obtained as follows: We consider the Purgatory games (n+1,m), which has two value classes, and in this game
positional (pure memoryless) optimal strategies exist for the safety player. We simplify the game by making the
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⊤
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⊥
Simplified purgatory dual (n,m)
⊤ v22
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⊤
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2
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v
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Figure 6: An illustration of the Purgatory Duel with m = n = 2. The two dashed edges have probability 12 each.
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start state a deterministic state with one action for each player that with probability one goes to the next state.
We call this simplified Purgatory, and strategies in simplified Purgatory corresponds to strategies in Purgatory
(n,m). Then we consider the dual of the simplified Purgatory, which is basically a mirror of the simplified
Purgatory, with roles of the players exchanged. In effect the dual is obtained by exchanging ⊤ and ⊥. Both in
the simplified Purgatory and the dual of simplified Purgatory, there are two value classes, and positional optimal
strategies exist for the safety player. The Puragatory duel is obtained by simply merging the start states of the
simplified Purgatory and the dual of the simplified Puragatory, thus from the start state we go to the first state of
the Purgatory (n,m) and the first state of the dual of Purgatory (n,m), each with probability half; see Figure 6.
Quite surprisingly we show that this simple merge operation gives a game where each state has a different value
(i.e., that has linear number of value classes instead of two value classes), and the patience of optimal strategies
increases from 1 (positional) to doubly-exponential (even for ǫ-optimal strategies) for the safety player.
3. From reachability to safety. The third surprising aspect is that we transfer a lower bound result from concurrent
reachability to concurrent safety games. Typically, the behavior of strategies of concurrent reachability and
safety games are different, e.g., for reachability games optimal strategies do not exist in general, whereas they
exist for concurrent safety games; and even in concurrent reachability games where optimal strategies exist, not
all locally optimal strategies are optimal, whereas in concurrent safety games all locally optimal strategies are
optimal. Yet we show that a lower bound example for concurrent reachability games can be modified to obtain a
lower bound for concurrent safety games. Moreover, we show that the strategy complexity results with respect
to the number of value classes in concurrent safety games is different and much more refined as compared to
reachability games (see Table 1).
Significance of our result. There are several significant aspects of our result.
1. Roundedeness and patience. As a measure of strategy complexity there are two important notions: (a) round-
edness, which is more relevant from the computational aspect; and (b) patience, which is the traditional game
theoretic measure. The roundedness is always at least the patience, and in this work we present matching bounds
for patience and roundedness (i.e., our upper bounds are for roundedness which are matched with lower bounds
for patience). Thus our results present a complete picture of strategy complexity with respect to both well-known
measures.
2. Computational complexity. In the study of stochastic games, the most well-studied way to obtain computational
complexity result is to explicitly guess strategies and then verify the resulting game obtained after fixing the
strategy. The lower bound for concurrent reachability games by itself did not rule out that improved compu-
tational complexity bounds can be achieved through better strategy complexity for safety games. Indeed, for
constant number of value classes, we obtain a better complexity result due to the exponential bound on round-
edness. Our doubly-exponential lower bound shows that in general the method of explicitly guessing strategies
would require exponential space, and would not yield NP or coNP upper bounds. In other words, our re-
sults establish that to obtain NP or coNP upper bound for concurrent safety games in general completely new
techniques are necessary.
3. Lower bound for algorithm. One of the most well-studied algorithm for games is the strategy-iteration algorithm
that explicitly modifies strategies. Our result shows that any natural variant of the strategy-iteration algorithm
for the safety player which explicitly compute strategies require exponential space in the worst-case.
4. Complexity of strategies. While the decision problem for games of whether the value is at least a threshold is
the most fundamental question, along with values, witness (close-to-)optimal strategies are required. Our results
present a tight bound on the complexity of strategies (which are as important as values).
In summary, our main contributions are optimal bounds on strategy complexity, and our lower bounds have significant
implications: it provides worst-case lower bound for a natural class of algorithms, as well rules out a traditional method
to obtain computational complexity results.
7.2 Interesting technical aspects
Remark 49 (Difference of exponential bounds). In this work we present two different exponential bound on patience.
The first for zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, and the second for non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with
safety objectives for all players. However, note that the nature of the lower bounds are very different. The first lower
bound is exponential in the number of actions, and the size of the state space is constant. In contrast, for non-zero-sum
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concurrent stochastic games with safety objectives for all players, if the size of the state space is constant, then our
upper bound on patience is polynomial. The second lower bound in contrast to the first lower bound is exponential in
the number of states (and the upper bound is polynomial in m and also the number of players).
Remark 50 (Concurrent games with deterministic transitions). We now discuss our results for concurrent games
with deterministic transitions. It follows from the results of [9] that for zero-sum games, there is a polynomial-time
reduction from concurrent stochastic games to concurrent games with deterministic transitions. Hence, all our lower
bound results for zero-sum games also hold for concurrent deterministic games. Observe that this is also true for
our lower bound on non-zero sum games with at least one reachability player, since we reduce the problem to the
zero-sum case. However, in general for non-zero-sum games polynomial-time reductions from concurrent stochastic
games to concurrent deterministic games are not possible. For example, for concurrent stochastic games with safety
objectives for all players we establish an exponential lower bound on patience of strategies that constitute an 1/6-Nash
equilibrium, whereas in contrast, our upper bound on patience shows that if the game is deterministic (i.e., δmin = 1)
and ǫ is constant, then there always exists an ε-Nash equilibrium that requires only polynomial patience.
Remark 51 (Nature of strategies for the reachability player). Another important feature of our result is as follows:
for zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, the characterization of [19] of ǫ-optimal strategies as monomial strategies
for reachability objectives, separates the description of the strategies as a part that is a function of ǫ, and a part that is
independent ǫ. The previous double-exponential lower bound on patience from [22, 20] shows that the part dependent
on ǫ requires double-exponential patience, whereas the part that is independent only requires linear patience. A
witness for ǫ-optimal strategies in Purgatory (as described in [14] for the value-1 problem for general zero-sum
concurrent stochastic game) can be obtained as a ranking function on states and actions, such that the actions with
rank 0 are played with uniform probability (linear patience); and an action of rank i at a state of rank j is played
with probability roughly proportional to ǫij . In contrast, since we show lower bound for optimal strategies (and
the strategies are symmetric) in Purgatory Duel, our lower bound implies that also the part that is independent of ǫ
requires double-exponential patience in general (i.e., the probability description of ǫ-optimal strategies needs to be
doubly exponentially precise).
7.3 Concluding remarks
In this work, we established the strategy complexity of zero-sum and non-zero-sum concurrent games with safety and
reachability objectives. Our most important result is the doubly-exponential lower bound on patience for ǫ-optimal
strategies, for ǫ > 0, for the safety player in concurrent zero-sum games. Note that roundedness is at least patience,
and we present upper bounds for roundedness that match our lower bound for patience, and thus we establish tight
bounds both for roundedness and patience. Our results also imply tight bounds on “granularity” of strategies (i.e., the
minimal difference between two probabilities). Since patience is the minimum positive probability, and some actions
can be played with probability 0, a lower bound on patience is a lower bound on granularity, and an upper bound on
roundedness is an upper bound on granularity. Finally, there are many interesting directions of future work. The first
question is the complexity of the value problem for concurrent safety games. While our results show that explicitly
guessing strategies does not yield desired complexity results, an interesting question is whether new techniques can be
developed to show that concurrent safety games can be decided in coNP in general. A second interesting question is
whether variants of strategy-iteration algorithm can be developed that does not explicitly modify strategies, and does
not have worst-case exponential-space complexity.
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